Yesterday, Apple submitted this preliminary incident report: 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1533655, which is reposted below.  

On 2019-03-06 we determined that we were issuing certificates with 
non-compliant serial numbers because of the EJBCA issue [1]. We fixed the 
problem within 24 hours and stopped issuing non-compliant certificates as of 
the afternoon of 2019-03-07 and are working to address previously issued 
certificates. All impacted certificates were issued to Apple entities.

To minimize impact to our users, we do not expect to revoke all impacted 
certificates within the 5-day requirement. We expect to provide a timeline for 
revoking all impacted certificates in a forthcoming update.

Certificates issued by the following CA's were impacted:

* Apple IST CA 2 - G1 (https://crt.sh/?id=5250464): TLS Server
* Apple IST CA 8 - G1 (https://crt.sh/?id=21760447): TLS Server
* Apple IST CA 5 - G1 (https://crt.sh/?id=12716200): S/MIME

Based on our initial analysis, the number of certificates impacted are as 
follows:

* TLS Server Certificates (from Apple IST CA 2 - G1, Apple IST CA 8 - G1)
--Total number of impacted certificates (issued since 2016-09-30): ~878,000
--Total number of impacted certificates that are still valid (not expired and 
not revoked) as of 2019-03-07 3:20 PST: ~558,000

* S/MIME Certificates (from Apple IST CA 5 - G1)
-- Total number of impacted certificates (issued since 2016-09-30): ~2,400
-- Total number of impacted certificates that are still valid (not expired and 
not revoked) as of 2019-03-07 3:20 PST: ~2,000

We expect to reply back with more details and a full incident report in a 
forthcoming update.

[1] Configurable SN Entropy, Default Value Raised to 20 Octets 
(https://www.ejbca.org/docs/EJBCA_7.0.1_Release_Notes.html)
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