Thanks Rob! Actually, as I look at one of these cases: https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=8628d8106b72c39d98e8e731fc3b9364940efea0dfbb4816b1382542a979c834
The latest certificate using the above key expires in just a few days. But you can see the track record of the same private key being used repeatedly to obtain new certificates. My question is this: When a certificate is revoked, is that certificate revoked in isolation, or is the private key used to obtain that certificate placed in some sort of blacklist where it cannot be used to obtain any future certificates? The scenario I'm picturing is that a customer gets a certificate revoked, but then just uses the same private key to obtain a new certificate. Potentially from another CA, if they have trouble with the one that did the revoking. I suppose that explaining to the revocation-receiving customer why the revocation happened is a good start. However, I could imagine that at least some of the involved customers may not fully grasp the concept of protecting private key material. After all, each one of the cases in these two batches is a case of the customer publishing the private key in an app in the Google Play store. I guess the general gist of what's going on here is that for each case we've reported in the two batches, the private key material is compromised. And as such, no certificate should ever be issued for such a key, by any CA (in my opinion). Does such a mechanism exist to prevent customers from shooting themselves in the foot in this way? (compromised key re-use) Related: The first batch that we notified included a number of already-expired certificates. Based on responses I got for those, I got the impression that there was no action to be taken by the CAs for those expired certificates. As a result, I ensured that the second batch omitted cases that lack evidence of a currently-valid certificate. If there is any key-level blacklisting going on with the CAs, this was perhaps an incorrect action to take on my part. Thoughts? Is there any value to sharing compromised keys used to obtain certificates that may already be expired? -- Thank you, Will Dormann ============================= Vulnerability Analyst CERT Coordination Center 4500 Fifth Ave. Pittsburgh, PA 15213 1-412-268-7090 ============================= On 4/4/2019 5:28 AM, Rob Stradling wrote: > I've just created a batch for this second list on the Revocation Tracker: > > https://misissued.com/batch/49/ > > On 03/04/2019 15:50, CERT Coordination Center wrote: >> Hi Wayne, >> >> Sorry about the delay in getting back to you. This first round of CA >> notifications went out at approximately 10AM Eastern time on March 25, 2019. >> >> I just sent out a new set of notifications. This time the notifications >> were limited only currently-valid certificates, as expired-cert >> notification was an oversight in the first batch. This second list is: >> >> ----- >> >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f2da5b49d3df3ebd9fe910c9972eea948f2d55f2f36c42658462f4b7aabe38a5 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=3198c26a22ed9d9602dad91e50dad40d67dcdae8075d2f7fca0c8b025c4a563b >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=1dbbd0bf172681ea65ef078865e6f38864e4b40282e9eff72d756383a7b21c51 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=ccf794fb078d757d59073173daec5ef7ba34a21ecdaa0f61761a21f5736a0fc7 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=8628d8106b72c39d98e8e731fc3b9364940efea0dfbb4816b1382542a979c834 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=c108876bca95ab02a0a3d10c7e38981cfc97789922a93bc3fed2a5734e93e97f >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=876b1175c135cd388d5b596985129a27967bdbbbe92c615ae9cdc7e33d6dfc62 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=71e1d2ce60955944b522ac4d9674e078f98a07e8edaaf1219c4324660e39139a >> https://crt.sh/?q=DC:66:CB:49:F6:DD:A8:13:5C:9D:7A:9E:F0:8A:1F:F7:6B:56:C2:57:88:20:6A:C4:63:F3:76:5B:47:7A:79:C7 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f7e6d9d6a0e18d4ba0526068f9a80e8a7bdbba1191a6bf6e0384545b57edd45c >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=98087a0e49cc3f232aa0e79ed84ec26e4ce07e5bca4e2913f2ff986b25ac4f57 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=d2e4cf3dbf22f164f2301525a9ba6c2185926717c0a930abf322356bfd75e593 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=fa362787ec3d1c185602d45e364fa3aa9049a6d54a15aa58302d123f37de621e >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=f5d5f1cdb56cbac9f7306469ca7380f16226b60689d288cc5154962c55bc1605 >> https://crt.sh/?spkisha256=a808916ae117cb5ef2c7e73ee11cff0231be1f706106110ca51df4e3914e8b24 >> >> ----- >> >> >> This second batch of notifications went out to the respective CAs at >> approximately 10:30AM Eastern time today (April 3, 2019) >> >> >
signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
_______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
