On 10/05/2019 05:25, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 10:44 PM Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

On 09/05/2019 16:35, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
Given that the remark is that such a desire is common, perhaps you can
provide some external references documenting how one might go about
configuring such a set-up, particularly in the context of TLS trust?
Similarly, I'm not aware of any system that supports binding S/MIME
identities to a particularly CA (effectively, CA pinning) - perhaps you
can
provide documentation and reference for systems that perform this?

Thanks for helping me understand how this 'common' scenario is actually
implemented, especially given that the underlying codebases do not
support
such distinctions.


My description is based on readily available information from the
following sources, that you should also have access to:


It looks like your links to external references may have gotten stripped,
as I didn't happen to receive any.

As it relates to the topic at hand, the system you described is simply that
of internal CAs, and does not demonstrate a need to use publicly trusted
CAs. Further, going back to your previous message, to which I was replying
to make sure I did not misunderstand, given that you stated it was common,
it seemed we established that such scenarios in that message, and further
expanded upon in this, already have the capability for enterprise
management.

I wanted to make sure I did my best to understand, so that we can have
productive engagement on substance, specifically around whether there is a
technical necessity for the use of non-Root CAs to be capable of issuance
under multiple different trust purposes. It does not seem as if there's
been any external references to establish a technical necessity, so it does
not seem like the policy needs to be modified, based on the available
evidence.


There were no links, only descriptions of obvious facts that you willfully ignore in an effort to troll the community.


Enjoy

Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S.  https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark.  Direct +45 31 13 16 10
This public discussion message is non-binding and may contain errors.
WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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