Ben, When, approximately, do you think this proposed updates would become effective, and specifically this item:
https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/206 Doug -----Original Message----- From: dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy-boun...@lists.mozilla.org> On Behalf Of Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy Sent: Thursday, October 1, 2020 4:22 PM To: mozilla-dev-security-policy <mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org> Subject: Policy 2.7.1 Issues to be Considered Below is a list of issues that I propose be addressed in the next version (2.7.1) of the Mozilla Root Store Policy (MRSP). There are currently 73 issues related to the MRSP listed here: https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues. So far, I have identified 13 items to consider for this policy update; which are tagged as v.2.7.1 in GitHub (https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/labels/2.7.1). I will appreciate your input on this list as to whether there are issues that should be added or removed. Then, based on the list, I will start a separate discussion thread in mozilla.dev.security.policy for each issue. #139 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/139> - Audits are required even if no longer issuing - Clarify that audits are required until the CA certificate is revoked, expired, or removed. Related to Issue #153. #147 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/147> - Require EV audits for certificates capable of issuing EV certificates – Clarify that EV audits are required for all intermediate certificates that are technically capable of issuing EV certificates, even when not currently issuing EV certificates. #153 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/153> – Cradle-to-Grave Contiguous Audits – Specify the audits that are required from Root key generation ceremony until expiration or removal from Mozilla’s root store. Related to Issue #139. #154 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/154> - Require Management Assertions to list Non-compliance – Add to MRSP 2.4 “If being audited to the WebTrust criteria, the Management Assertion letter MUST include all known incidents that occurred or were still open/unresolved at any time during the audit period.” #173 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/173> - Strengthen requirement for newly included roots to meet all past and present requirements – Add language to MRSP 7.1 so that it is clear that before being included CAs must comply and have complied with past and present Mozilla Root Store Policy and Baseline Requirements. #186 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/186> - Clarify MRSP 5.3 Requirement to Disclose Self-signed Certificates – Clarify that self-signed certificates with the same key pair as an existing root meets MRSP 5.3’s definition of an intermediate certificate that must be disclosed in the CCADB. #187 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/187> - Require disclosure of incidents in Audit Reports – To MRSP 3.1.4 “The publicly-available documentation relating to each audit MUST contain at least the following clearly-labelled information: “ add “11. all incidents (as defined in section 2.4) that occurred or were still open/unresolved at any time during the audit period, or a statement that the auditor is unaware of any;” #192 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/192> - Require information about auditor qualifications in the audit report – Require audit statements to be accompanied by documentation of the auditor’s qualifications demonstrating the auditor’s competence and experience. #205 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/205> - Require CAs to publish accepted methods for proving key compromise – Require CAs to disclose their acceptable methods for proving key compromise in section 4.9.12 of their CPS. #206 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/206> - Limit re-use of domain name verification to 395 days – Amend item 5 in MRSP 2.1 with “and verify ownership/control of each dNSName and iPAddress in the certificate's subjectAltName at intervals of 398 days or less;” #207 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/207> - Require audit statements to provide information about which CA Locations were and were not audited, and the extent to which they were (or were not) audited #211 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/211> - Align OCSP requirements in Mozilla's policy with the section 4.9.10 of the Baseline Requirements #218 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/218> Clarify CRL requirements for End Entity Certificates – For CRLite, Mozilla would like to ensure that it has full lists of revoked certificates. If the CA uses partial CRLs, then require CAs to provide the URL location of their full and complete CRL in the CCADB. Ben Wilson Mozilla Root Program Manager _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
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