On 2020-10-15 11:36 μ.μ., Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy wrote:
  This issue is presented for resolution in the next version of the Mozilla
Root Store Policy. It is related to Issue #147
<https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/147> (previously posted for
discussion on this list on 6-Oct-2020).

Possible language is presented here:
https://github.com/BenWilson-Mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/c1acc76ad9f05038dc82281532fb215d71d537d4

In addition to replacing "if issuing EV certificates" with "if capable of
issuing EV certificates" in two places -- for WebTrust and ETSI audits --
it would be followed by "(i.e. a subordinate CA under an EV-enabled root
that contains no EKU or the id-kp-serverAuth EKU or anyExtendedKeyUsage
EKU, and a certificatePolicies extension that asserts the CABF EV OID of
2.23.140.1.1, the anyPolicy OID, or the CA's EV policy OID)." Thus, Mozilla
considers that a CA is capable of issuing EV certificates if it is (1) a
subordinate CA (2) under an EV-enabled root (3) that contains no EKU or the
id-kp-serverAuth EKU or anyExtendedKeyUsage EKU, and (4) a
certificatePolicies extension that asserts the CABF EV OID of 2.23.140.1.1,
the anyPolicy OID, or the CA's EV policy OID.

I look forward to your suggestions.

Hello Ben,

I am trying to understand the expectations from Mozilla:

- If a CA that has an EV-capable RootCA , uses a subCA Certificate that contains the id-kp-serverAuth EKU and the anyPolicy OID that does not issue EV end-entity Certificates, is this considered a policy violation if this subCA is not explicitly included in an EV audit scope (ETSI or WebTrust)?

- If a subCA Certificate that contains the id-kp-serverAuth EKU and the anyPolicy OID was not covered by an EV-scope audit (because it did not issue EV Certificates) and it later decides to update the profile and policies/practices to comply with the EV Guidelines for everything related to end-entity certificates in order to start issuing EV Certificates and is later added to an EV-scope audit, is that an allowed practice? Judging from the current EV Guidelines I didn't see anything forbidding this practice. In fact this is supported via section 17.4.

The proposed language is a bit confusing so hopefully by getting Mozilla's position on the above two questions, we can propose some improvements.


Best regards,
Dimitris.



Thanks,

Ben
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