FWIW - Here is a recent post on this issue from JC Jones -
https://github.com/mozilla/crlite/issues/43#issuecomment-726493990


On Thu, Nov 19, 2020 at 4:00 PM Ryan Hurst via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> On Wednesday, November 18, 2020 at 8:26:50 PM UTC-8, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 18, 2020 at 7:57 PM Ryan Hurst via dev-security-policy <
> > dev-secur...@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> >
> > > Kathleen,
> > >
> > > This introduces an interesting question, how might Mozilla want to see
> > > partial CRLs be discoverable? Of course, they are pointed to by the
> > > associated CRLdp but is there a need for a manifest of these CRL
> shards
> > > that can be picked up by CCADB?
> > >
> > What's the use case for sharding a CRL when there's no CDP in the issued
> > certificates and the primary downloader is root stores?
>
> I think there may be some confusion. In my response to Kathleen's mail I
> stated " Of course, they are pointed to by the associated CRLdp", as such I
> am not suggesting there is a value to sharded/partitioned CRLs if not
> referenced by the CRLdp.
>
> The origin of my question is that as I remember the requirements, CAs do
> not have to produce a full and complete CRL. Specifically today, I believe
> they are allowed to produce partitioned CRLs, this is good because in some
> cases a full and complete CRL can be gigabytes in size. I assume the reason
> for adding the URL to a full, and I imagine complete, CRL is that Mozilla
> would like to use this information in its CRLLite feature.
>
> If so, and a CA partitions CRLs and does not produce a full and complete
> CRL how should the CA ensure Mozilla has the entire set of information it
> wants?
>
> Ryan
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