On Thursday, January 26, 2023 at 7:18:53 PM UTC-5 wash...@gmail.com wrote:
Thanks. Happy New Year. Sorry, the Spring Festival holiday delayed some 
time.

BJCA separates and operates two independent certification systems in the 
following aspects:
1. Certification Practice Statement
i. Global Certification system CPS 
<https://www.bjca.cn/u4d/%E7%94%B5%E5%AD%90%E8%AE%A4%E8%AF%81%E4%B8%9A%E5%8A%A1%E8%A7%84%E5%88%99%EF%BC%88CPS%EF%BC%89/files/%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E6%95%B0%E5%AD%97%E8%AE%A4%E8%AF%81%E8%82%A1%E4%BB%BD%E6%9C%89%E9%99%90%E5%85%AC%E5%8F%B8%E5%85%A8%E7%90%83%E8%AE%A4%E8%AF%81%E4%BD%93%E7%B3%BB%E7%94%B5%E5%AD%90%E8%AE%A4%E8%AF%81%E4%B8%9A%E5%8A%A1%E8%A7%84%E5%88%99%20Beijing%20Certificate%20Authority%20Co.,%20Ltd.%20Global%20Certification%20Practice%20Statement.pdf>
ii. Domestic Certification system CPS 
<https://www.bjca.cn/u4d/%E7%94%B5%E5%AD%90%E8%AE%A4%E8%AF%81%E4%B8%9A%E5%8A%A1%E8%A7%84%E5%88%99%EF%BC%88CPS%EF%BC%89/files/%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E6%95%B0%E5%AD%97%E8%AE%A4%E8%AF%81%E8%82%A1%E4%BB%BD%E6%9C%89%E9%99%90%E5%85%AC%E5%8F%B8%E7%94%B5%E5%AD%90%E8%AE%A4%E8%AF%81%E4%B8%9A%E5%8A%A1%E8%A7%84%E5%88%99.pdf>

2. The two independent certification management systems are operated within 
its own segmented networks and resources such as cabinets, server 
hardwares, operating system environments and HSMs are independent and not 
shared.

what ensures a person cannot access cabinet A from one environment and then 
cabinet B from a second environment?

Is there physical separation of the cabinets, or are they still physically 
located near each other where a reasonable individual might incidentally 
open the wrong cabinet?
3. A Policy Management Authority (PMA) within the company is responsible 
for monitoring the operations of the two certification management systems. 
The CEO of the company is the chief of the PMA now. All members of the PMA 
are employees of the company. 

4. The operation team members have to be approved by the PMA and trained 
for qualification before being enlisted in the trusted-role list of the 
Global Certification Management System to get into regular operation 
activities. Physical and logical access priviledges for Global 
Certification Management System are issued following the roles of 
operations in the trusted-role list. All members of the operation team are 
full-time employees working for the company.
 
5. Automated monitoring system which detects unauthorized changes to 
critical files or send alerts for security events has been implemented.
 
6. Automation has been implemented on the global certification system for 
checking, such as linting tools certlint, x509lint and zlint.

7. In order to maintain compliance, BJCA has built up ISO 27001 ISMS as the 
foundation of its management and got certified. BJCA conducts regular 
internal audits and risk assessments following its ISMS management system 
requirements. BJCA also accept external audits for the two independent 
certification management systems:
i. The global certification system: WebTrust.
ii. The domestic certification system: regular audit of the authority 
department of the government to maintain its certification service license.
在2023年1月27日星期五 UTC+8 01:03:56<bwi...@mozilla.com> 写道:
I have added BJCA's email addresses, including "wash...@gmail.com", to the 
list with posting privileges. Hopefully this will enable some responses.
Thanks,
Ben

On Thu, Jan 26, 2023 at 9:00 AM Ben Wilson <bwi...@mozilla.com> wrote:
>From BJCA - 
Hi Ben,
When we reply to the forum through our gmail account, we are prompted that 
we have no permission. This gmail address (wash...@gmail.com) represents 
BJCA, please help to add permissions so that we can participate in the 
discussion, thank you.

lip...@bjca.org.cn
------------------------ 
I'll see what I can do to get this straightened out.
Ben

On Wed, Jan 25, 2023 at 7:06 PM Kurt Seifried <ku...@seifried.org> wrote:
Is BJCA.cn still on this list? if we've only got 3 weeks (21 days) and they 
take 2+ days to answer we're going to run out of time pretty quickly. 

On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 6:11 PM Kurt Seifried <ku...@seifried.org> wrote:
This seems to mostly depend upon BJCA.cn disclosing information to us. 
Information we have asked for in the past but been told is "confidential" 
and so on.

So with this in mind: BJCA.cn: can you please explain how your company is 
structured to prevent subversion of the root certificate authority? E.g. 
technical measures can be circumvented trivially if the people running them 
are told to do so (and if they don't they can be replaced with people that 
will). 

On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 4:57 PM Ben Wilson <bwi...@mozilla.com> wrote:
All,

We recently concluded a six-week public discussion on the CCADB Public list 
for the root inclusion request of Beijing CA (BJCA), 
https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public/c/o9lbCbr92Ug/m/lPkqrHF1DQAJ. 
This 
email is to announce a continued 3-week discussion of BJCA’s inclusion 
application to be held on this list. The reason for this continued 
discussion is that we need to gather more information to better understand 
BJCA’s operational and management controls and the One Pass software (among 
any other issues that might be raised during this continued discussion).

The current state of our understanding is summarized in the post referenced 
in the link above. That is, BJCA operates two different infrastructures, 
one that meets the needs of its national government and another that aims 
to meet the needs of the global public. Also, according to BJCA, the One 
Pass software was mislabelled as spyware.

There hasn’t been enough evidence yet to make conclusions about these two 
questions–how is management and operation of the two infrastructures 
separated, given that they both are part of the same company, and did the 
Beijing One Pass software have any components that would be considered 
spyware? I would expect that BJCA might want to respond initially to these 
questions, even if they believe that they have answered them adequately in 
the past.  

We need fact-based discourse that answers these questions.

In addition to these questions, does anyone have examples of other conduct 
by BJCA or insights into its practices? Can anyone provide more information 
about BJCA’s information security practices, compliance with international 
standards, or performance under other metrics that will help determine its 
future conduct, were it to become a publicly trusted CA?

I’d like to continue this discussion through Monday, February 13, 2023. As 
with the public discussion held on CCADB Public, please reply directly in 
this discussion thread with thoughtful and constructive comments, and a 
representative of BJCA must respond here to all questions or issues that 
are raised.

Thanks,

Ben

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