All, This email opens up discussion of our proposed resolution of GitHub Issue #258 <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/258> (SMIME Baseline Requirements).
We plan to add requirements to version 2.9 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy <https://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/> regarding the CA/Browser Forum’s S/MIME Baseline Requirements. We propose to update Mozilla’s Root Store Policy to require annual S/MIME BR audits as follows. - Section 2.2, second bullet point modified to directly reference that email verification must be in accordance with section 3.2.2 of the S/MIME BRs - Section 2.3, - First paragraph – add the following sentence (as a second sentence): Certificates issued on or after September 1, 2023, that are capable of being used to digitally sign or encrypt email messages, and CA operations relating to the issuance of such certificates, MUST conform to the latest version of the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted S/MIME Certificates. - Change the remaining references of “Baseline Requirements” in this section to “S/MIME and TLS Baseline Requirements”. To indicate that the statements apply to both. - Section 3.1.2 - Add ETSI TS 119 411-6 as audit criteria - Add WebTrust for CAs - S/MIME as audit criteria - Sections 3.2, 3.3, 5.2, 7.1 - Change “Baseline Requirements” to “S/MIME and TLS Baseline Requirements”. To indicate that the statements apply to both. - Section 5.1 add a statement: “The following curves are not prohibited, but are not currently supported: P-521, Curve25519, and Curve448.” - And add a sentence: “EdDSA keys MAY be included in certificates that chain to a root certificate in our root program if the certificate contains ‘id-kp-emailProtection` in the EKU extension. Otherwise, EdDSA keys MUST NOT be included.” - Section 5.3.1 - Move the following sentence from the end of the current second paragraph up to its own stand-alone paragraph. - "The conformance requirements defined in section 2.3 of this policy also apply to technically constrained intermediate certificates." - Revise last paragraph with proposed new text: - “If the intermediate CA certificate includes the id-kp-emailProtection extended key usage, then to be considered technically constrained, it MUST comply with section 7.1.5 of the S/MIME Baseline Requirements <https://cabforum.org/smime-br/> and include the Name Constraints X.509v3 extension with constraints on rfc822Name, with at least one name in permittedSubtrees, each such name having its ownership validated according to section 3.2.2 of the S/MIME Baseline Requirements <https://cabforum.org/smime-br/>.” - Change remaining existing occurrences of “Baseline Requirements” to “TLS Baseline Requirements”. We look forward to your constructive feedback on these proposed changes to the MRSP. We will start a separate discussion about dates/timelines and when compliance audits will be due for these new requirements. Regards, Ben and Kathleen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "dev-security-policy@mozilla.org" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to dev-security-policy+unsubscr...@mozilla.org. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/CA%2B1gtaaHxfSrm7m_2MNXh7wZ-66Cgj_cmn-OMqJv2KH1xiad4w%40mail.gmail.com.
