On Wed, Jan 17, 2024 at 3:51 PM Xiaohui Lam <inaos...@gmail.com> wrote: > > This is a funny challenge that WebPKI (actually iotPKI) could face. When IPv6 > becomes available and cheaper, every matters, things connected to internet, > will have urgent needs to secure authentication and identification protocols. > > If the device manufacturer can prove that the private key is stored in the > security chip and cannot be exported, and the security chip has a relevant > white paper published, the CA and society should accept it. > > On the contrary, if it is stored in a general NAND or SD card, we need to > continue the discussion below.
The use of such a security chip would however not fundamentally change the threat model. Even if we presume that it would not be able to extract the private key from the security chip under any circumstances, you could still have the security chip perform the cryptographic operations necessary to accept valid connections protected by the certificate/private key. The process of doing so would be slightly more involved than just copying the key file and using it from elsewhere, but fundamentally the threat is the same. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "dev-security-policy@mozilla.org" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to dev-security-policy+unsubscr...@mozilla.org. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/d/msgid/dev-security-policy/CAEZM%3DbO_YyPhxwo7c5R%2BSVsydxT0bBaUZeTCw2u0JYzgATCY6g%40mail.gmail.com.
