Heikki Toivonen wrote:

> I fail to see this. What is not changeable? What do you propose instead?

Gerv is pretty adamant about supporting EV, and doesn't seem swayed at
all by any arguments and discounts everything everyone has said in the
past, yet so readily accepts Verisign's proposals...

> Some people have pushed for making SSL errors such that you cannot just
> click OK and proceed to the site. I'd like to see that happen. The thing
> that seems to be holding this back is the fear of misconfigured sites
> becoming inaccessible. In any case, that can be done with or without EV
> certs.

This might be good or bad, disabling click through might end up making
people disable SSL altogether, would that be better, perhaps at least
there wouldn't be an assumption of privacy, although even with SSL
things could be subverted by Governments.

> I fail to find the logic in not letting me know the identity of the
> website operators I want to do business with.

ok this is the crux of my argument, the problem I have isn't with the
proposal, it is with the assumptions being stated as fact surrounding
it, ie "This will make users safer" which is a load of crap, since most
people shopping online may or may not be in a position to sue, and law
enforcement may or may not be more willing to do anything about any
transgressions.

We can assume (with some certainty, anyone that has dealt with small
companies will know how much they can penny pinch) because of cost very
few people will purchase EV certificates, in my opinion it will be a
really small amount, perhaps 1, or at most 2% of all certificates
purchased (I think someone else mentioned that Verisign only expects
1%), so we are left with a situation of EV certificates only covering 1%
of business, this will either discriminate against small business that
doesn't have a business case to pay exorbitant fees for SSL certificates
or they will simply not use SSL at all so there is no warnings presented
to users, this could have a very negative effect rather then a positive one.

> Hmm, so is your suggestion that instead of EV we should use something
> like petnames instead? I don't think petname-like systems alone can
> solve the problem nor do I think EV alone can solve the problem. I think
> we need both. This thread is about discussing EV.

I don't think we need EV certificates, it's a thinly veiled attempt at
retaining a monopoly position, however it has the potential to back fire
and put users at more risk, not less.

People have been creating relationships for a very long time with
business without having some 3rd party tell them the relationship will
be good or bad (word of mouth is still the best form of advertising).

The bigger issue here is identity checks don't show trust, they show
identity, Gerv is saying this is ok because the checks are extensive
enough that you will be able to sue someone, but this isn't always the
case, take Enron for example, I'm sure before all that happened with
them people would have said they were trustworthy.

What is needed is research into safer browsing, not assumptions by one
company designed to let it keep it's monopoly position in a market, this
doesn't benefit users (how can it when most certs won't be EV?).

I'm not saying trust bar et al are the answer, but at least the guys
making those proposals have at least conducted research into what end
users think when hitting sites and thinking out side of the whole PKI is
the only way to do this box.

Where is the research and studies conducted to say this is any better
then what we have already? Where are the impact studies to show that
this won't in fact lead to less SSL use, not better SSL use? In fact was
any research or studies conducted to say this will do anything to
protect users, or is this simply a thought exercise saying this is what
we think is best for everyone and what we say goes?

-- 

Best regards,
 Duane

http://www.cacert.org - Free Security Certificates
http://www.nodedb.com - Think globally, network locally
http://www.sydneywireless.com - Telecommunications Freedom
http://e164.org - Because e164.arpa is a tax on VoIP

"In the long run the pessimist may be proved right,
    but the optimist has a better time on the trip."
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