I actually think the modular approach is better for the web developer as the policy is easier to write and understand.
But I do share your concern, Atleast right now, it is pretty easy to say -- user agents that support XSSModule are protected against XSS and user agents that support history module are protected against history enumeration attacks. Going forward, we want to keep the separation just as clear and simple. * This would require very clear and simply stated threat models for each module. Each module's threats should be (ideally) disjoint. * A module should be small and complete. We should make it clear why every part of the module is important for the given threat model. This would hopefully ensure that browser vendors either implement the whole module or none of it. (I.E implementing half of a module will give no security) I think this breakup of the spec into modules is useful to the webdevelopers (making it easier to understand) and easier for the browser vendors to implement. Regards Devdatta _______________________________________________ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security
