You want the application to be able to overlay things on top of the picture. Think a barcode scanner, an OCR system, an AR app and so on. OS imposed previews might be a problem.
--Dev On 11 April 2012 01:39, Adrienne Porter Felt <a...@berkeley.edu> wrote: > No, in our proposal, it's up to the app to provide a preview or the final > result (or not). The user knows what his or her phone is pointing at and > whether the context is appropriate. A non-malicious app will provide a > preview on its own; a malicious app might not, but the user won't click the > icon if he/she doesn't trust the app to take a photo of the physical space > the user is in at the moment. (We assume that the trusted button can be > the topmost element and it appears for perhaps a half second or so before > it is clickable.) > > On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 1:33 AM, JOSE MANUEL CANTERA FONSECA > <j...@tid.es>wrote: > >> El 11/04/12 02:59, "Adrienne Porter Felt" <a...@berkeley.edu> escribió: >> >> >I'd like to propose the following based on discussions at Berkeley & with >> >others about camera access: >> > >> >-- The OS provides two trusted UI buttons. One has a photo icon, and the >> >other has a recording icon. Applications can embed these icons into >> their >> >UIs but cannot write over them. >> >-- When the user presses one of these buttons, a photo is taken or >> >recording begins. >> >The result is returned to the user. >> >> I'm a bit confused ... So, the user cannot see a preview of the photo to >> be taken? >> >> > >> >> >> Este mensaje se dirige exclusivamente a su destinatario. Puede consultar >> nuestra política de envío y recepción de correo electrónico en el enlace >> situado más abajo. >> This message is intended exclusively for its addressee. We only send and >> receive email on the basis of the terms set out at >> http://www.tid.es/ES/PAGINAS/disclaimer.aspx >> > > _______________________________________________ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security
