On 17/09/13 03:52, Brian Smith wrote:
> One thing that is up for debate is what the security/privacy tradeoff
> should be. In particular, the channel ID keypair itself acts like a
> cryptographically strong cookie and could be used for tracking. The
> Chromium team has implemented some measures to make it so that channel
> ID is treated like cookies in terms of the browser's cookie management
> policy. We should investigate whether we could improve the privacy
> protections for this mechanism to make sure it doesn't become a
> new/better way to track people. 

Is it fair to say that, the way the Chrome team have implemented it, it
is an _equivalent_ way to track people, and your aim is to make it a
_less_good_ way? Or do you think that the current implementation is a
better way, and you aim to make it equivalent?

> Ideally, we would know which cookies
> were associated with a login event (username/password submission,
> Persona/BrowserID login, etc), and then only generate and use a
> Channel ID keypair in those situations. However, this would require us
> to be able to classify cookies into "authentication" and "tracking"
> buckets, which is something that we probably cannot do perfectly and
> automatically. 

Is there even such a distinction? An authentication cookie can also be
used for tracking.

Could we make things better by refusing point blank to do third party
channel IDs? We don't have a legacy problem like we do with cookies.

> Because this mechanism would require changes to both
> clients and servers for it to be effective, it seems reasonable that
> we could require servers that want to use Channel ID to do something
> special when the user logs in, if needed. And/or, we may be able to
> repurpose some of the password manager login detection logic to detect
> when to start using ChannelID for a server.

This logic is not enormously robust (although it's been rejigged
recently, IIRC).

Gerv

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