Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote:
> Frank Hecker:
<snip>
>> Eddy, I think it would be unwise (to put it mildly) to make a major change 
>> like
>> disabling Entrust's email trust bit in a rush. We have no idea at this point
>> what the impact of a change like that would be. And in any case the change is
>> irrelevant to Firefox 3, since AFAIK Firefox would never consult the email
>> trust bit.
> 
> I took this comment from the bug also to here, since I think it more 
> appropriate to discuss it at the mailing list.
> 
> I think we have some opposing views on the subject. Well, it isn't the 
> first time... :-)

So let me make my own views clear on two points that you made on we ma 
have some opposing views:

First, with respect to the impact of turning off the Entrust email trust 
bit, my concern is as follows: There may Entrust-controlled subordinates 
under the Entrust root that issue email certificates, and also 
non-Entrust CAs cross-signed by Entrust (like DigiNotar) that issue 
email certificates. Unlike DigiNotar, some of those subordinate CAs or 
cross-signed CAs may actually comply with Mozilla CA policy with regard 
to issuing email certificates. If so, I'd like to look at the 
possibility of adding their CA certificates as trust anchors, so that 
their email certificates will continue to work, and so users of 
Thunderbird and other Mozilla-based mail clients will not be unduly 
impacted by any disabling of email trust at the Entrust root level.

I especially interested in whether any of the CAs waiting in our request 
queue have cross-signing arrangements with Entrust. If so, that may 
affect the priority we assign to evaluating their requests. There may be 
other CAs that are taking advantage of Entrust cross-signing to get 
their certificates recognized in Firefox, Thunderbird, etc., but have 
never submitted a request to us to include their roots. I am less 
worried about these CAs, but it might be nice to at least be able to 
tell them what we're doing and ask them to submit their own inclusion 
requests.

Second, with regard to schedule: We are at a critical point in the 
Firefox 3 schedule, with Firefox 3 RC1 coming up fast. Firefox 3 does 
not use the email trust bit, so there is no need to tie any Entrust 
email trust bit changes to the Firefox 3 schedule. Instead we should 
look at the schedule for upcoming update releases of Thunderbird and 
SeaMonkey, and determine what sort of timeframe we have for making a 
change like this.

Frank

-- 
Frank Hecker
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
_______________________________________________
dev-tech-crypto mailing list
dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto

Reply via email to