Thank you to those of you who have reviewed this request and
contributed to the discussion. Your time and commitment to this
process is greatly appreciated!

To summarize this discussion, there were three areas that were of
primary interest. They were:

1) Inclusion of a root that expires in a year and half
* The recommendation will be to not include the TC TrustCenter Class 1
CA root, which will be phased out before the end of 2010.

2) Questions about the Class 0 certificates that are part of the CPS.
These questions were answered.

3) Questions about the externally-operated subordinate CAs.
Information was provided and clarified. There is an externally-
operated subordinate CA chaining to the TC TrustCenter Class 2 CA II
root, which is used to issue device certificates and email
certificates for internal use only. The device name and the email
address belong to a company internal domain, so the ownership is
guaranteed.

It is requested that TC TrustCenter do the following two action items
before signing future externally-operated subordinate CAs:
1) Add statements in the TC TrustCenter CP/CPS and in the relevant sub-
CA CP/CPS that require that the sub-CA CP/CPS be published when the
sub-CA is allowed to issue certificates outside of their company/
organization.
2) Audit the externally-operated sub-CAs against the same criteria as
the TC TrustCenter CAs annually. Consider including the externally-
operated sub-CAs in the annual audit that a third-party performs
against the TC TrustCenter CAs.

This concludes the public discussion for TC TrustCenter’s request to
add four root CA certificates to the Mozilla root store, as documented
in the following bug: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=392024

I will update the bug to summarize the request and recommend that
Mozilla approve inclusion of three roots:  TC TrustCenter Class 2 CA
II, TC TrustCenter Class 3 CA II, and TC TrustCenter Universal CA I.

Thanks,
Kathleen
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