On 3/5/09 15:43, Eddy Nigg wrote:
On 05/03/2009 10:06 AM, Ian G:
(2), there exists a standard need in audits to discuss disaster
recovery. Curiously, this does not appear to be documented anywhere,
draw your own speculations....
It's usually addressed in internal CA documentations and audited
accordingly. Disaster recovery is certainly part of the usual audits,
OK, sorry, I should have said "documented anywhere that is reliable to
the users." Which is to say, it's useless, because without some
external visibility, there is no reason to believe that there is
anything reliable about that which is hidden.
(To be totally clear, I don't really think disaster recovery is a big
issue, in my personal opinion. 1. It's never happened. 2. It is a
conventional/business thing, more than a security thing; which is to
say, in security work, if we end up with the whole system being
unplugged, actually, we aren't unhappy, that's quite secure....
different perspectives for different folks. Although I grant that
OCSP/CRL requires a bit more thought before reaching a conclusion.)
root compromise is such a disaster IMO.
Precisely. Just exactly why is there such a need for root compromise to
be dealt with, but the PKI world denies its existance? Draw your own
conclusions.
(4) no review of existing grandfathered roots has been done.
That's not entirely correct, legacy CAs which requested EV enabled had
to go through the process as if they were new roots. See also the
current thread of Verizon/Cybertrust.
Ah! Well corrected. I did not know that. Are you serious? Is the
stated CA undergoing a full review by Mozo? All at the same time?
iang
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