That's correct - those credentials should require privileged access. On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 10:25 AM, Steve Niemitz < sniem...@twitter.com.invalid> wrote:
> Re: ZK credential files, thats an interesting issue, I assume you don't > want the role user to be able to read it either, and only root or some > other privileged user? > > On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 12:14 PM, Erb, Stephan < > stephan....@blue-yonder.com> > wrote: > > > I am in favor of your proposal. We offer less attack surface if the > > executor is not running as root. > > > > Interesting though, this introduces another security problem: The > > credentials file in the incoming Zookeeper ACL patch ( > > https://reviews.apache.org/r/45042/) will have to be readable by > > everyone. That feels a little bit like being back to square one. > > ________________________________________ > > From: Steve Niemitz <sniem...@apache.org> > > Sent: Tuesday, March 29, 2016 17:34 > > To: dev@aurora.apache.org > > Subject: Looking for feedback - Setting CommandInfo.user by default when > > launching tasks. > > > > I've been working on some changes to how aurora submits tasks to mesos, > > specifically around Docker tasks, but I'd also like to see how people > feel > > about making it more general. > > > > Currently, when Aurora submits a task to mesos, it does NOT set > > command.user on the ExecutorInfo, this means that mesos configures the > > sandbox (mesos sandbox that is) as root, and launches the executor > > (thermos_executor in our case) as root as well. > > > > What then happens is that the executor then chown()s the sandbox it > creates > > to the aurora role/user, and also setuid()s the runners it forks to that > > role/user. However, the executor itself is still running as root. > > > > My proposal / change is to set command.user to the aurora role by > default, > > which will cause the executor to run as that user. I've tested this > > already, and no changes are needed to the executor, it will still try to > > chown the sandbox (which is fine since it already owns it), and setuid() > > the runners it forks (again, fine, since they're already running as that > > user). > > > > *The controversial part of this* however is I'd like to enable this > > behavior BY DEFAULT, and allow disabling it (reverting to the current > > behavior now) via a flag to the scheduler. My reasoning here is two > fold. > > 1) It's a more secure default, preventing a compromised executor from > > doing things it shouldn't, and 2) we already have a lot of "flag bloat", > > and flags are hard enough to discover as they are. However, I do believe > > this should be considered as a "breaking change", particularly because of > > finicky PEX extraction for the executor. > > > > I'd like to hear people's thoughts on this. > > >
