Severity: important 

Affected versions:

- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-atmosphere-websocket) 4.0.0 before 4.14.8
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-atmosphere-websocket) 4.15.0 before 
4.18.3
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-atmosphere-websocket) 4.19.0 before 
4.21.0

Description:

Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized 
Actor, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel in 
Atmosphere Websocket Component.

The camel-atmosphere-websocket consumer mapped inbound WebSocket query 
parameters into the Camel Exchange header map without applying any 
HeaderFilterStrategy (WebsocketConsumer.sendEventNotification() iterates the 
query-string map collected in WebsocketConsumer.service() and copies each entry 
into the Exchange). Because nothing blocked the Camel header namespace, a 
client connecting to the WebSocket endpoint could set Camel-internal control 
headers - including CamelHttpUri (Exchange.HTTP_URI) - simply by supplying them 
as query parameters. In a route where the WebSocket consumer feeds a downstream 
HTTP producer, the injected CamelHttpUri redirects the server-side HTTP request 
to an attacker-chosen destination (server-side request forgery - for example to 
an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint). In addition, the HTTP 
producer resolves Camel property placeholders on the resulting 
(attacker-controlled) URI, so placeholders embedded in the injected value - 
such as an environment-variable reference, an application property, or a vault 
reference - are resolved to their real values and sent to the attacker, 
disclosing environment variables, application properties and vault secrets. 
When the WebSocket endpoint is exposed without authentication, this is 
reachable by an unauthenticated remote attacker.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 
4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If 
users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade 
to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested 
to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes the consumer apply the HeaderFilterStrategy 
it already inherits from the HTTP/servlet stack, filtering the Camel header 
namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so externally-supplied Camel* 
/ camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that 
cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from the inbound 
message before they reach any downstream producer (for example 
removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), 
require authentication on the WebSocket endpoint, and avoid bridging an 
untrusted consumer directly into an HTTP producer whose target URI can be 
driven from message headers.

Credit:

Kamalpreet Singh (finder)
Andrea Cosentino (remediation developer)

References:

https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-55993.html
https://camel.apache.org/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55993

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