Severity: important
Affected versions:
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-websocket) 4.0.0 before 4.14.8
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-websocket) 4.15.0 before 4.18.3
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-websocket) 4.19.0 before 4.21.0
Description:
Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized
Actor, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel in
Vertx Websocket component.
The camel-vertx-websocket consumer mapped inbound WebSocket query and path
parameters into the Camel Exchange header map without applying any
HeaderFilterStrategy (VertxWebsocketConsumer.populateExchangeHeaders()).
Because nothing blocked the Camel header namespace, a client connecting to the
WebSocket endpoint could set Camel-internal control headers - including
CamelHttpUri (Exchange.HTTP_URI) - simply by supplying them as query
parameters. In a route where the WebSocket consumer feeds a downstream HTTP
producer, the injected CamelHttpUri redirects the server-side HTTP request to
an attacker-chosen destination (server-side request forgery - for example to an
internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint). In addition, the HTTP producer
resolves Camel property placeholders on the resulting (attacker-controlled)
URI, so placeholders embedded in the injected value - such as an
environment-variable reference, an application property, or a vault reference -
are resolved to their real values and sent to the attacker, disclosing
environment variables, application properties and vault secrets. When the
WebSocket endpoint is exposed without authentication, this is reachable by an
unauthenticated remote attacker.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before
4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If
users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade
to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested
to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes the affected consumers apply a
HeaderFilterStrategy that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively
on inbound mapping, so externally-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no
longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade
immediately, strip the Camel control headers from the inbound message before
they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and
removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), require authentication on
the WebSocket endpoint, and avoid bridging an untrusted consumer directly into
an HTTP producer whose target URI can be driven from message headers.
Credit:
Kamalpreet Singh (finder)
Andrea Cosentino (remediation developer)
References:
https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-46726.html
https://camel.apache.org/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-46726
