Severity: moderate
Affected versions:
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel) 4.14.0 before 4.14.8
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel) 4.15.0 before 4.18.3
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel) 4.19.0 before 4.21.0
Description:
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.
The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel
components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering
('java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*', or the no-'javax.**' variant in the
aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive 'java.**' glob that admits
classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably
java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a
Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a
HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing
java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied
host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check
passes because the resulting object's class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS
query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an
out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family
because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject()
unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components:
camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http,
camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components
camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation
repository).
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before
4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to a version that contains the CAMEL-23372 fix
once available: 4.21.0 for the 4.21.x line, 4.18.3 for the 4.18.x line, and
4.14.8 for the 4.14.x line. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately,
configure a JMS-provider-side allow-list (Apache ActiveMQ Artemis
'deserializationAllowList' / 'deserializationDenyList', Apache ActiveMQ Classic
'org.apache.activemq.SERIALIZABLE_PACKAGES') as the primary mitigation, and/or
override the in-code default via the endpoint-level 'deserializationFilter'
option or the JVM-wide '-Djdk.serialFilter' system property with an explicit
deny: '!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' (or
'!java.net.**;java.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' for the aggregation-repository
components, which do not include javax.**).
Credit:
Venkatraman Kumar from Securin (finder)
Yu Bao from Paypal (finder)
References:
https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-42527.html
https://camel.apache.org/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42527
