Severity: moderate
Affected versions:
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-google-storage) 4.0.0 before 4.14.9
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-google-storage) 4.15.0 before 4.18.4
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-google-storage) 4.19.0 before 4.22.0
Description:
Relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel Google Storage component.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.9, from 4.15.0 before
4.18.4, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.0.
The camel-google-storage consumer downloads Google Cloud Storage objects to the
local filesystem when the downloadFileName option is set. That option is
documented as a folder or a filename, and when its value contains no expression
token the consumer builds the local destination by appending the object name to
it: evaluateFileExpression sets the Exchange file-name header to the remote
object name and evaluates downloadFileName + "/${file:name}". The ${file:name}
token returns the file-name header verbatim, unlike ${file:onlyname}, which
applies FileUtil.stripPath to it. The resulting string was passed directly to
new File(result) and blob.downloadTo(file.toPath()) with no lexical
normalization and no check that the destination stayed inside the configured
directory. The object name is not route-controlled data: the consumer lists the
bucket, iterates every returned blob and creates one exchange per object from
blob.getBlobId().getName() verbatim, and the filter option that could restrict
those names is not applied at all unless it has been explicitly set. Google
Cloud Storage object names are opaque UTF-8 keys that the service stores and
lists exactly as written, with no server-side canonicalization, and a forward
slash is only a display convention for pseudo-directories, so a key containing
parent-directory segments survives round-tripping intact. An object name
containing such segments therefore resolved to a location outside the
configured downloadFileName directory, letting anyone able to influence the
names present in the consumed bucket cause Camel to create or overwrite a file
at a location of their choosing, with the privileges of the Camel process.
Depending on what the process can write to, overwriting a file outside the
download directory can escalate beyond the loss of integrity of that file. The
downloadFileName option is an ordinary consumer parameter and carries no
security marker, so nothing signalled to users that its value was not being
enforced as a containment boundary. The defect is consumer-only; the producer
has no download-to-file sink. Camel's other file-download consumers -
camel-file, camel-ftp, camel-smb, camel-mina-sftp, camel-azure-files and the
Azure Storage download paths - already constrained their local downloads to the
configured directory using a path-segment boundary check; camel-google-storage
was the remaining object-store download sink not covered by that work.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. If
users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade
to 4.14.9. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested
to upgrade to 4.18.4. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, set the
filter option to a regular expression that accepts only simple single-segment
object names, so that any name carrying a path separator or a parent-directory
segment is excluded before an exchange is created; note that no filtering
whatsoever is applied when the option is left unset, and that the expression is
matched against the whole object name. Alternatively, give downloadFileName an
explicit expression that does not carry the remote path through, for example
one built on ${file:onlyname} rather than the implicit ${file:name}, keeping in
mind that a downloadFileName containing an expression is treated as
route-author-controlled and is not covered by the containment check added in
the fix. As defence in depth, treat the object names in any externally writable
bucket as untrusted input and do not derive local filesystem paths from them.
Credit:
n0mi1k (finder)
Andrea Cosentino (remediation developer)
References:
https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-66907.html
https://camel.apache.org/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-66907
