Definitely hoping that we can have all platforms use the same primitives. Ian's intent and navigation whitelists work on Android and iOS atm I believe.
On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 1:31 PM, Chuck Lantz <cla...@microsoft.com> wrote: > I asked Kevin Hill from the Windows team working on the security model for > Windows apps in Windows 10 to take a look at the document reference below > for commentary given his experience in this area (including W3C > involvement). He added a few comments to the doc. > > Andrew, is your proposal intended to be Android specific or are you > proposing that elements like allow-navigation be introduced for iOS and > other platforms as well? > > -Chuck > > -----Original Message----- > From: agri...@google.com [mailto:agri...@google.com] On Behalf Of Andrew > Grieve > Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2015 7:59 AM > To: dev > Subject: Re: Proposal for CSP support > > I'm not sure allowing plugins to modify an apps security policy is a good > idea because CSP only really works when the dev understands it and puts > thought into it. > > A build step for CSP might be tricky because we don't actually know which > .html files might be navigated to (as opposed to XHR'ed for templates). It > could also be that some pages need different CSP than others. > > So, with Ian's whitelist changes > - We disallow apps from navigating, openExteral, and XHR'ing by default > - If they want the <access> behaviour back, they can install the > legacy-whitelist plugin. > > Question is, what do we want them to actually do? > Right now there's two new whitelist plugins: > - navigation-whitelist & intent-whitelist > - They look for <allow-navigation> and <allow-intent> respectively > - Neither of these actually open up all network access. > > I'd like to propose that for simplicity, we have only one "new" whitelist > plugin that: > - Does what navigation-whitelist & intent-whitelist do > - Opens up all network requests on the native side > - Has JS that runs on start-up that alert()s if no CSP meta tag is > present. > - It should recommend adding in the CSP that is used in the default > app template as a start > > This should cover 99% of use-cases (people shouldn't need to write their > own whitelist plugins), and (I hope) will be simple enough to figure out > without reading too much documentation. > > > > > On Fri, Feb 20, 2015 at 5:12 PM, Jason Chase <cha...@chromium.org> wrote: > > > Chuck, > > > > Thanks for the feedback, it's good to know others are interested in CSP. > > > > I've created a doc to capture the proposal in a little more detail, > > and allow for more robust comments: > > > > https://docs.google.com/document/d/1sfFs6LB1_giodyR4QwBMQssLKP_UxACZif > > k-VYVX2T8/edit?usp=sharing > > > > In that doc, I've attempted to address the questions/comments both > > from your email, as well as Michal's earlier response. I'll let all > > interested parties continue the conversation in the doc. > > > > Thanks, > > Jason > > > > On 20 February 2015 at 10:54, Chuck Lantz <cla...@microsoft.com> wrote: > > > > > Hey Jason - Glad to see this proposal! A number of us at Microsoft > > > have been talking along these same lines actually. Windows 10 apps > > > will > > include > > > CSP support as the latest version of IE has support so I'd say we're > > > completely in support of moving Cordova apps down this path. In > > > fact I'd want to make sure that any CSP related metadata tag > > > injection also > > applied > > > to the Windows platform as well. > > > > > > A few of thoughts: > > > > > > 1. I definitely know there is quite a bit of interest still in being > > > able to enable hosted (https accessed and controlled by the > > > developer) app content access Cordova device APIs (which is > > > currently a shortcoming of Windows 8.0/8.1 apps so we hear about it > > > quite a bit). As a result, > > we'll > > > want to be sure Cordova doesn't inhibit this use case at a base level. > > > That said, having a default CSP policy that restricts hosted in the > > > template is fine and would promote secure practices since you need > > > to exercise caution when mixing in any remote content even when you > > > control > > it > > > completely. Also agree with inline being high risk. > > > > > > 2. Re: Long term, one thing that CSP doesn't cover well is which > > > URIs should be granted elevated device access. Given hosted content > > > with > > plugin > > > device API access is still a scenario we'll need to consider, > > > perhaps we should consider using the config.xml <access> element to > > > represent URIs that have device API access (beyond standard browser > > > access). Otherwise > > we > > > get into a bit of an "all or nothing" situation as it pertains to > > > hosted app content which poses a larger security risk if you opt to > > > extend > > device > > > API access beyond local content. (It also strikes me this is a > > > general > > gap > > > in the web standard as a whole.) > > > > > > 3. Eval is actually a bit tougher - I know when we've look at this > > > in the past it impacted JS frameworks far more than inline did. > > > (Ex: With > > Angular > > > you can stop using eval but you take a perf hit which is a bigger > > > deal on mobile than desktop.) Definitely the most secure practice - > > > but it also could cause the default template to appear to "not > > > work." If we omit the "unsafe-eval" directive in the CSP policy in > > > the template we'll want to > > be > > > crystal clear on how to alter it. That could be solved with proper > > > documentation and blog posts though. > > > > > > 4. I'd suggest we also consider the new "browser" platform here > > > since Chrome/Firefox/IE (as of Win 10) have support. Should be > > > "free", but I'm guessing the metadata tag injection you mention is > > > something we could probably just do all-up rather than only for > specific platforms. > > > > > > -Chuck > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: mmo...@google.com [mailto:mmo...@google.com] On Behalf Of > > > Michal Mocny > > > Sent: Thursday, February 19, 2015 2:25 PM > > > To: dev > > > Subject: Re: Proposal for CSP support > > > > > > Thanks for this clear outline. > > > > > > Jason, I know you've been working on the short-term items for a > > > while as part of your investigation, fixing things as you went -- > > > what is the current state of CSP support in platforms / plugins? > > > What portion > > already > > > has fixes (or PR for them), what work is known but undone, and what > > hasn't > > > been investigated much at all? > > > > > > -Michal > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 19, 2015 at 4:55 PM, Jason Chase <cha...@chromium.org> > > wrote: > > > > > > > I'm interested in full-blown support for CSP (Content Security > > > > Policy) in Cordova. While we're close to having new and improved > > > > whitelist functionality, there are gaps in what the whitelist is > > > > able to protect against. In particular, inline script and eval() > > > > are higher risks that are not addressed by whitelists. > > > > > > > > Many Cordova apps may use only static content, or not include any > > > > third-party content. However, there are certainly examples of > > > > apps that need to include user input/third-party content, mixed > > > > with the app's own HTML content. In some cases, platforms may > > > > even restrict functionality (see [1]). I think CSP is a compelling > > > > answer for these scenarios, and for security in general for apps. > > > > > > > > Assuming CSP support is valuable, the question is how to implement? > > > > Support for CSP is not universal across platforms. It is known to > > > > be supported on Android (KitKat and later), iOS (since 7.1), and > Firefox. > > > > Where supported, it is typically via a HTTP response header, or a > > > > META tag in the document. > > > > > > > > I've done some investigation into feasible approaches. As a > > > > result, I'm proposing as below. > > > > > > > > Long term goal: > > > > Cordova supports CSP in apps *and* plugins, and is enabled/secure > > > > by default. Ideally, CSP rules can be configurable and > > > > automatically applied to all content (i.e. so developers can fall > > > > into the pit of > > > > success) > > > > > > > > Achieving this goal will likely require incremental progress over > > > > a number of releases. At a high level, first make changes so > > > > developers can manually apply CSP to their apps. Longer term, add > > > > support for configurability and automatic application of CSP. > > > > > > > > Short term plan: > > > > - Change new app template to contain CSP meta tag with a default, > > > > secure policy (i.e. no inline script, eval(), only local app > > > > content) > > > > - Remove any blockers to default policy from framework and core > > plugins. > > > > This would be a continuation of the work in CB-8210, applied to > > > > other platforms. For example, this would fix any framework code > > > > that relies on sending javascript to be executed inline, from the > > > > native side > > > > - Deprecate any framework APIs that allow less secure practices. > > > > Many already are marked as deprecated (at least on Android) > > > > - Update docs/samples to include CSP, and clearly state that use > > > > of inline javascript is deprecated > > > > > > > > Long term plan: > > > > - In a future major release, remove the previously deprecated > > > > framework APIs > > > > - Define/implement a configuration model for CSP rules > > > > - Implement a build/package step to apply configured CSP rules to > > > > all content as meta tags. Run-time support involves re-writing > > > > content, and/or intercepting resource requests. The feasibility > > > > of intercepting requests is highly variable across platforms, at > > > > greater cost/complexity than build-time. > > > > > > > > I'm very interested in any comments on this proposal. This > > > > includes questions around use cases (missing or otherwise), > > > > different requirements, technical concerns, .etc. > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > Jason > > > > Google Cordova Team > > > > > > > > [1] http://callback.markmail.org/thread/yxmmya2o2lc26tpi > > > > > > > > > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscr...@cordova.apache.org > For additional commands, e-mail: dev-h...@cordova.apache.org >
