On Feb 13, 2009, at 5:31 PM, Jarek Gawor wrote:
On Fri, Feb 13, 2009 at 2:58 PM, Kevan Miller
<[email protected]> wrote:
On Feb 13, 2009, at 11:47 AM, Joe Bohn wrote:
Based on the positive feedback to my proposal I updated out wiki
process
document with the steps I proposed earlier. See
http://cwiki.apache.org/GMOxPMGT/geronimo-project-policies.html for
details.
Sorry, I thought that I'd replied to this, already.
I have one change -- a *release* (i.e. a release vote) must precede
the
formal announcement of a vulnerability.
I'm not sure I agree with this. We should not need a new release for
any security problem. We should be able to announce any vulnerability
as long as we provide work-arounds (i.e. how to disable a component or
whatever to prevent the security vulnerability from being exposed in
the first place) or provide patches that fix the vulnerability (in
binary, source or whatever format). For example, say we have some
security problem in Axis2 plugin. In that case, we should be able to
release new (fixed) Axis2 plugin and provide instructions on how to
uninstall the old plugin and install the new one. In other cases we
could just publish somewhere an updated jar file and tell people how
to update it.
This way we could create a new release at any point after the
vulnerability was announced and be totally open when we commit fixes
for the problem (i.e. reference CVE in log messages at the commit time
and have CVE mentioned in the release notes, etc.)
I'd thought about a "reasonable configuration work-around" clause or a
plugin/jar release. Both are potentially valid options. However, I
don't think they should be our preferred mode. IMO, our preferred mode
should be a full Geronimo "release".
Configuration work-arounds typically disable some feature (so that
users won't be exposed to a vulnerability). In cases where the
vulnerability presents a high (or well-known) risk, I think a
configuration work-around is a valid approach to quickly reducing the
risk caused by the exposure.
A plugin/jar *release* could also work. As long as it is an official
Geronimo project release. However, it seems less than desirable. There
will be confusion about whether or not someone has installed the new
plugin/jar, etc. I'd much prefer to see a full release.
A simple source code patch is not going to be acceptable to me --
unless the project votes on the patch code and creates a "release".
Simpler, I think to create a full release.
A full Geronimo server release is the easiest and least confusing
means of delivering security updates to our users. It is the same
technique used by multiple Apache projects. I think we can make it
work for us, also.
--kevan
