I like the proposal. However I see no need for the 'C' categor, y and disagree about changing defaults during any future 2.next bump.
HonorCipherOrder, as an example, must be inverted. Users requiring 'C' can override things to make that happen. I see two 'quick start' one-line configs, strictly modern and cpu intensive, or equally modern and just a bit more relaxed about cipher strength. Any other client is no longer interoperable with any popular site, following final changes by issues in Dec '16. On May 2, 2017 8:19 AM, "Stefan Eissing" <[email protected]> wrote: > With 71 configuration directives, mod_ssl can manage probably every user's > needs, but two: Mr and Ms Normal. > > Ms and Mr Normal have a basic understanding about SSL, sorry TLS, and what > a cipher is, but HonorCipherOrder is already a bit much and on OCSP > stapling, the mind becomes a little bit hazy. They are smart and well > educated in their field of work, they just do have not the time to read up > on these things. > > But they have heard about internet security and want people visiting their > site to be safe (which is always relative). > > What they do now is take Apache, google a bit around, find something on > stackoverflow or maybe even the Mozilla config generator ( > https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/) and copy > and paste what they find into their config file. > > And then they never touch the config for the next couple of years. They > will get updates and security fixes from the Linux distribution, but as > long as the server runs, they will not investigate into a better SSL > setting any more. > > But everyone working in internet security know that these settings are > (and maybe forever will be) in flux. Ciphers fall out of grace, new > protocol versions rise and features like OCSP and HSTS get invented. > > How can we help Mr and Ms Normal to stay up to date on these things? > > - We cannot rewrite their config unasked. We need to be backward > compatible. > - Our defaults nowadays are dangerously unsafe, so users MUST do their own > settings. > > I advocate that we need (yet another!) SSL directive where administrators > can declare their *intent*. > > A. "I want my site safe and usable with modern browsers!" > B. "I want a safe setting, but people with slightly out-dated clients > should be served as well." > C. "I sadly need compatibility to some very old clients." > > and Apache would figure out what these intentions mean for protocols, > ciphers, ordering, ocsp and other settings. We ship updates with every > release when they make sense to us. We could even ship a CVE Fix downstream > that removes a certain cipher and it would apply to all sites using this > new setting. > > Does this make sense? I personally would use this on my sites... > > Cheers, > > Stefan > > PS. Yes, I would use Mozilla's modern/intermediate/old definitions, but > that discussion would be the next step. > > > > >
