I was cleaning up some of our private code - and came across the patch below - exposing the SHARED_CHIPHERs.
We scratch this itch in a few places to help force (or prevent) the forcing of a protocol upgrade from application land. No idea how common that is - any reason not to submit this as a suggestion for some future httpd version ? Dw Index: modules/ssl/ssl_engine_vars.c =================================================================== --- modules/ssl/ssl_engine_vars.c (revision 620141) +++ modules/ssl/ssl_engine_vars.c (working copy) @@ -320,6 +320,11 @@ else if (ssl != NULL && strcEQ(var, "COMPRESS_METHOD")) { result = ssl_var_lookup_ssl_compress_meth(ssl); } + else if (ssl != NULL && strcEQ(var, "SHARED_CIPHERS")) { + char buf[ 1024 * 16 ]; + if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(ssl,buf,sizeof(buf))) + result = apr_pstrdup(p,buf); + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT else if (ssl != NULL && strcEQ(var, "TLS_SNI")) { result = apr_pstrdup(p, SSL_get_servername(ssl, Index: modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c =================================================================== --- modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c (revision 620141) +++ modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c (working copy) @@ -1067,6 +1067,7 @@ "SSL_SERVER_A_KEY", "SSL_SERVER_A_SIG", "SSL_SESSION_ID", + "SSL_SHARED_CIPHERS", NULL }; and config SSLSessionCache None SSLSessionCacheTimeout 1 ... EOM