What exactly are we looking for? URLs to dependencies with http?


> On 21 May 2019, at 21:38, Denis Magda <dma...@gridgain.com> wrote:
> 
> Yeap,
> 
> This looks like a candidate for the change.
> 
> Peter, Anton, is there a quick way to prepare a list of such dependencies 
> where "http" is to be replaced with "https"?
> 
> --
> Denis Magda
> 
> 
> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 7:17 AM Ilya Kasnacheev <ilya.kasnach...@gmail.com 
> <mailto:ilya.kasnach...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> Hello!
> 
> I think we still have a http dependency on H2:
> 
>         <repository>
>             <releases>
>                 <enabled>false</enabled>
>             </releases>
>             <snapshots>
>                 <enabled>true</enabled>
>                 <updatePolicy>always</updatePolicy>
>                 <checksumPolicy>ignore</checksumPolicy>
>             </snapshots>
>             <id>h2database.com <http://h2database.com/></id>
>             <name>Snapshot repository on h2database.com 
> <http://h2database.com/></name>
>             <url>http://h2database.com/m2-repo 
> <http://h2database.com/m2-repo></url>
>             <layout>default</layout>
>         </repository>
> 
> WDYT?
> 
> Regards,
> -- 
> Ilya Kasnacheev
> 
> 
> вт, 21 мая 2019 г. в 17:08, Denis Magda <dma...@apache.org 
> <mailto:dma...@apache.org>>:
> 
> > Igniters,
> >
> > Could anybody confirm we don’t have any issues with that?
> >
> > Denis
> >
> > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> > From: *Apache Security Team* <secur...@apache.org 
> > <mailto:secur...@apache.org>>
> > Date: Tuesday, May 21, 2019
> > Subject: PRIORITY Action required: Security review for non-https dependency
> > urls
> > To: Apache Security Team <secur...@apache.org <mailto:secur...@apache.org>>
> >
> >
> > ASF Security received a report that a number of Apache projects have
> > build dependencies downloaded using insecure urls. The reporter states
> > this could be used in conjunction with a man-in-the-middle attack to
> > compromise project builds.  The reporter claims this a significant
> > issue and will be making an announcement on June 10th and a number of
> > press releases and industry reaction is expected.
> >
> > We have already contacted each of the projects the reporter detected.
> > However we have not run any scanning ourselves to identify any other
> > instances hence this email.
> >
> > We request that you review any build scripts and configurations for
> > insecure urls where appropriate to your projects, fix them asap, and
> > report back if you had to change anything to secur...@apache.org 
> > <mailto:secur...@apache.org> by
> > the 31st May 2019.
> >
> > The most common finding was HTTP references to repos like maven.org 
> > <http://maven.org/> in
> > build files (Gradle, Maven, SBT, or other tools).  Here is an example
> > showing repositories being used with http urls that should be changed
> > to https:
> >
> > https://github.com/apache/flink/blob/d1542e9561c6235feb902c9c6d781b 
> > <https://github.com/apache/flink/blob/d1542e9561c6235feb902c9c6d781b>
> > a416b8f784/pom.xml#L1017-L1038
> > <https://github.com/apache/flink/blob/d1542e9561c6235feb902c9c6d781ba416b8f784/pom.xml#L1017-L1038
> >  
> > <https://github.com/apache/flink/blob/d1542e9561c6235feb902c9c6d781ba416b8f784/pom.xml#L1017-L1038>>
> >
> > Note that searching for http:// might not be enough, look for http\://
> > too due to escaping.
> >
> > Although this issue is public on June 10th, please make fixes to
> > insecure urls immediately.  Also note that some repos will be moving
> > to blocking http transfers in June and later:
> >
> > https://central.sonatype.org/articles/2019/Apr/30/http- 
> > <https://central.sonatype.org/articles/2019/Apr/30/http->
> > access-to-repo1mavenorg-and-repomavenapacheorg-is-being-deprecated/
> >
> > The reporter claims that a full audit of affected projects is required
> > to ensure builds were not made with tampered dependencies, and that
> > CVE names should be given to each project, however we are not
> > requiring this -- we believe it’s more likely a third party repo could
> > be compromised with a malicious build than a MITM attack.   If you
> > disagree, let us know. Projects like Lucene do checksum whitelists of
> > all their build dependencies, and you may wish to consider that as a
> > protection against threats beyond just MITM.
> >
> > Best Regards,
> > Mark J Cox
> > VP, ASF Security Team
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > -
> > Denis
> >

Reply via email to