I like the idea of working on the spec and prioritizing. I will update the wiki.
- Joestein On Wed, Jun 4, 2014 at 1:11 PM, Jay Kreps <jay.kr...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hey Joe, > > Thanks for kicking this discussion off! I totally agree that for something > that acts as a central message broker security is critical feature. I think > a number of people have been interested in this topic and several people > have put effort into special purpose security efforts. > > Since most the LinkedIn folks are working on the consumer right now I think > this would be a great project for any other interested people to take on. > There are some challenges in doing these things distributed but it can also > be a lot of fun. > > I think a good first step would be to get a written plan we can all agree > on for how things should work. Then we can break things down into chunks > that can be done independently while still aiming at a good end state. > > I had tried to write up some notes that summarized at least the thoughts I > had had on security: > https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/KAFKA/Security > > What do you think of that? > > One assumption I had (which may be incorrect) is that although we want all > the things in your list, the two most pressing would be authentication and > authorization, and that was all that write up covered. You have more > experience in this domain, so I wonder how you would prioritize? > > Those notes are really sketchy, so I think the first goal I would have > would be to get to a real spec we can all agree on and discuss. A lot of > the security stuff has a high human interaction element and needs to work > in pretty different domains and different companies so getting this kind of > review is important. > > -Jay > > > On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 12:57 PM, Joe Stein <joe.st...@stealth.ly> wrote: > > > Hi,I wanted to re-ignite the discussion around Apache Kafka Security. > This > > is a huge bottleneck (non-starter in some cases) for a lot of > organizations > > (due to regulatory, compliance and other requirements). Below are my > > suggestions for specific changes in Kafka to accommodate security > > requirements. This comes from what folks are doing "in the wild" to > > workaround and implement security with Kafka as it is today and also > what I > > have discovered from organizations about their blockers. It also picks up > > from the wiki (which I should have time to update later in the week based > > on the below and feedback from the thread). > > > > 1) Transport Layer Security (i.e. SSL) > > > > This also includes client authentication in addition to in-transit > security > > layer. This work has been picked up here > > https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KAFKA-1477 and do appreciate any > > thoughts, comments, feedback, tomatoes, whatever for this patch. It is a > > pickup from the fork of the work first done here > > https://github.com/relango/kafka/tree/kafka_security. > > > > 2) Data encryption at rest. > > > > This is very important and something that can be facilitated within the > > wire protocol. It requires an additional map data structure for the > > "encrypted [data encryption key]". With this map (either in your object > or > > in the wire protocol) you can store the dynamically generated symmetric > key > > (for each message) and then encrypt the data using that dynamically > > generated key. You then encrypt the encryption key using each public key > > for whom is expected to be able to decrypt the encryption key to then > > decrypt the message. For each public key encrypted symmetric key (which > is > > now the "encrypted [data encryption key]" along with which public key it > > was encrypted with for (so a map of [publicKey] = > > encryptedDataEncryptionKey) as a chain. Other patterns can be > implemented > > but this is a pretty standard digital enveloping [0] pattern with only 1 > > field added. Other patterns should be able to use that field to-do their > > implementation too. > > > > 3) Non-repudiation and long term non-repudiation. > > > > Non-repudiation is proving data hasn't changed. This is often (if not > > always) done with x509 public certificates (chained to a certificate > > authority). > > > > Long term non-repudiation is what happens when the certificates of the > > certificate authority are expired (or revoked) and everything ever signed > > (ever) with that certificate's public key then becomes "no longer > provable > > as ever being authentic". That is where RFC3126 [1] and RFC3161 [2] come > > in (or worm drives [hardware], etc). > > > > For either (or both) of these it is an operation of the encryptor to > > sign/hash the data (with or without third party trusted timestap of the > > signing event) and encrypt that with their own private key and distribute > > the results (before and after encrypting if required) along with their > > public key. This structure is a bit more complex but feasible, it is a > map > > of digital signature formats and the chain of dig sig attestations. The > > map's key being the method (i.e. CRC32, PKCS7 [3], XmlDigSig [4]) and > then > > a list of map where that key is "purpose" of signature (what your > attesting > > too). As a sibling field to the list another field for "the attester" as > > bytes (e.g. their PKCS12 [5] for the map of PKCS7 signatures). > > > > 4) Authorization > > > > We should have a policy of "404" for data, topics, partitions (etc) if > > authenticated connections do not have access. In "secure mode" any non > > authenticated connections should get a "404" type message on everything. > > Knowing "something is there" is a security risk in many uses cases. So > if > > you don't have access you don't even see it. Baking "that" into Kafka > > along with some interface for entitlement (access management) systems > > (pretty standard) is all that I think needs to be done to the core > project. > > I want to tackle item later in the year after summer after the other > three > > are complete. > > > > I look forward to thoughts on this and anyone else interested in working > > with us on these items. > > > > [0] > > > > > http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/what-is-a-digital-envelope.htm > > [1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3126 > > [2] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3161 > > [3] > > > > > http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/standards-initiatives/pkcs-7-cryptographic-message-syntax-standar.htm > > [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XML_Signature > > [5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_12 > > > > /******************************************* > > Joe Stein > > Founder, Principal Consultant > > Big Data Open Source Security LLC > > http://www.stealth.ly > > Twitter: @allthingshadoop <http://www.twitter.com/allthingshadoop> > > ********************************************/ > > >
