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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KNOX-3418?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=18104760#comment-18104760
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ASF subversion and git services commented on KNOX-3418:
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Commit de71a60cdf34c842abb8a49f770a0e33fe33c7e9 in knox's branch
refs/heads/master from hanicz
[ https://gitbox.apache.org/repos/asf?p=knox.git;h=de71a60cd ]
KNOX-3418: Path traversal → arbitrary file write/overwrite in the Apache Knox
Admin API (#1349)
> Path traversal → arbitrary file write/overwrite in the Apache Knox Admin API
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: KNOX-3418
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KNOX-3418
> Project: Apache Knox
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: Server
> Affects Versions: 2.1.0, 3.0.0
> Reporter: Tamás Hanicz
> Assignee: Tamás Hanicz
> Priority: Blocker
> Time Spent: 0.5h
> Remaining Estimate: 0h
>
> Reported by greybtw
>
> Path traversal in the Knox Admin API resource-management endpoints (PUT
> /admin/api/v1/\{providerconfig,descriptors,topologies}/\{name}). The
> client-supplied resource name is URL-decoded and validated against
> RESOURCE_NAME_PATTERN = ^[\w-/.]+$, whose character class admits / and . (the
> - is literal), so a ../ traversal passes validation. The decoded name is then
> written via new File(dest, name) + FileUtils.writeStringToFile with no
> canonical-path containment check, so an authenticated admin-role user can
> write/overwrite a file outside the managed
> shared-providers/descriptors/topologies directories, with an attacker-chosen
> filename and extension (getFileNameForResource keeps the name verbatim when
> it already has a .)
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