If OSM metadata is believed by OSMF to be personal data, so should be photos added to Wikimedia Commons with a geotag. If anything, it's a stronger proof that the user was there. I wonder what their legal team thinks of it.
śr., 20 cze 2018, 11:41 użytkownik Jochen Topf <[email protected]> napisał: > On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 09:03:01AM +0200, Frederik Ramm wrote: > > > All of > > > this needs to be tied in the OAuth stuff and it has to be done in a way > > > that 3rd party services using OSM data can ask *their* downstream users > > > to identify in the same way which allows OSM to track everybody who > uses > > > the full OSM data everywhere adding more personal data to keep and to > > > explain to users and get permissions from users for. > > > > No, there's a mistake in your reasoning here. > > > > It is true that downstream data distributors like Overpass or the > > Geofabrik downloads need to be able to verify whether someone has an OSM > > account or not. Pascal has been doing that for ages on his HDYC site, > > for example. > > > > But downstream data distibutors do not need to know or store anything > > more than that; the Geofabrik download server for example will not even > > store the user name of the person who has logged in, just that "whoever > > is here has just proven they have an OSM account". So the downstream > > distributor can deal with this without processing any personal data. (It > > would be possible to extend our OAuth system by a call that would not > > even return the user's identity to the caller - currently the identity > > is returned to the caller and the caller must then decide whether to > > process it or not.) > > It doesn't matter if you store the user name or not. If you ask somebody > to enter personal information, you have to tell them them what this is > for. The user doesn't understand how OAuth works or how it is > configured, so for them both the downstream site and OSMF get the > personal information, so you have to explain to the user what's > happening, even if you don't store the data for more than the few > milliseconds it needs to authenticate them. And the downstream site has > to make the user aware of any restrictions, too. > > And chances are all of this will end up in some logfiles unless > everybody makes sure it doesn't. > > And if you actually want to make sure that redacted data (because the > user wanted it to be deleted) is deleted downstream also, you have to > know who you gave this data to and inform them or find some other way > of informing them. > > > > Please stop this nonsense now! > > > > Given these alternatives, I think the course currently followed by the > > OSMF is the least disruptive. > > It might be "the least disruptive", but if it doesn't make any sense, > that doesn't make it better. Any judge will laugh at you if you tell > them: Well, we trust the million users we already have and the other 6 > billion who can sign on to OSM anonymously more than we trust the > general public. > > I don't know what the right way of handling this is, but I do know that > this isn't the right way. It isn't even a step in the right direction. > It is a step towards making the project more closed and burying it in > burocracy. You are ceding ground leading into a morass of legal details > instead of arguing that this data needs to be public for everyone. > > Jochen > -- > Jochen Topf [email protected] https://www.jochentopf.com/ > +49-351-31778688 > > _______________________________________________ > dev mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.openstreetmap.org/listinfo/dev >
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