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Hudson commented on PHOENIX-4189: --------------------------------- FAILURE: Integrated in Jenkins build Phoenix-master #1806 (See [https://builds.apache.org/job/Phoenix-master/1806/]) PHOENIX-4189 Introduce a class that wraps the Map of primary key data (jtaylor: rev e47e78477802940148b6457021a6362cefb002e6) * (edit) phoenix-hive/src/main/java/org/apache/phoenix/hive/PrimaryKeyData.java > Avoid direct use of ObjectInputStream in Hive integration > --------------------------------------------------------- > > Key: PHOENIX-4189 > URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4189 > Project: Phoenix > Issue Type: Bug > Reporter: Josh Elser > Assignee: Josh Elser > Fix For: 4.12.0 > > Attachments: PHOENIX-4189.001.patch, PHOENIX-4189_addendum.patch > > > Another security scan ding, but not a very big concern. > We use ObjectInputStream to serialize/deserialize a Map which contains the > columns+values of the primary key constraint. The problem with > ObjectInputStream is that it doesn't care what Class it deserializes. If a > malicious user can someone coerce some unknowing user to use an InputSplit > that has this specially crafted class, we can get into an arbitrary code > execution. > https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/se-lookahead/ outlines a way to > work around this issue in code, but it leaves a bit to be desired. The > ObjectInputStream recursively calls itself as it deserializes the fields in > the Object. By trusting some classes from the packages java.lang, java.util, > and java.sql, I believe we can remove this minor concern. -- This message was sent by Atlassian JIRA (v6.4.14#64029)