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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4198?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16197052#comment-16197052
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Ankit Singhal commented on PHOENIX-4198:
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I'm not sure we should require that a user who creates an index or view have
read and exec access on the parent table as well as all indexes on the parent
table. Its possible that we might have a user that only executes ddl commands.
bq. User need READ(and EXEC) access on data table to build the index, although
it may not hold true for async indexes if they are built by another user. And,
the purpose why user requires READ access on data table, is to restrict from
anybody to create views(As we don't have any other special permission in HBase
for logical entities).
bq. In PhoenixAccessController.authorizeOrGrantAccessToUsers should the boolean
haveAccess=false be within the loop on requiredActionsOnTable ?
yep, Thanks
bq. Also when you check if the user already has the action in {{if
(permToTable.implies(action)) {}} should you also check that the
permToTable.getUser() equals userPermission.getUser() ?
Actually, we are only getting the table permission of particular user of data
table only. so, we don't need to check it again.
{code}
List<UserPermission> permsToTable =
getPermissionForUser(permissionsOnTheTable,userPermission.getUser());
{code}
bq. Can you add a test that verifies that users that have access the data table
also have access to an index after its created?
Added a test for the same in a new patch(v4).
> Remove the need for users to have access to the Phoenix SYSTEM tables to
> create tables
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: PHOENIX-4198
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4198
> Project: Phoenix
> Issue Type: Bug
> Reporter: Ankit Singhal
> Assignee: Ankit Singhal
> Labels: namespaces
> Fix For: 4.13.0
>
> Attachments: PHOENIX-4198.patch, PHOENIX-4198_v2.patch,
> PHOENIX-4198_v3.patch
>
>
> Problem statement:-
> A user who doesn't have access to a table should also not be able to modify
> Phoenix Metadata. Currently, every user required to have a write permission
> to SYSTEM tables which is a security concern as they can
> create/alter/drop/corrupt meta data of any other table without proper access
> to the corresponding physical tables.
> [~devaraj] recommended a solution as below.
> 1. A coprocessor endpoint would be implemented and all write accesses to the
> catalog table would have to necessarily go through that. The 'hbase' user
> would own that table. Today, there is MetaDataEndpointImpl that's run on the
> RS where the catalog is hosted, and that could be enhanced to serve the
> purpose we need.
> 2. The regionserver hosting the catalog table would do the needful for all
> catalog updates - creating the mutations as needed, that is.
> 3. The coprocessor endpoint could use Ranger to do necessary authorization
> checks before updating the catalog table. So for example, if a user doesn't
> have authorization to create a table in a certain namespace, or update the
> schema, etc., it can reject such requests outright. Only after successful
> validations, does it perform the operations (physical operations to do with
> creating the table, and updating the catalog table with the necessary
> mutations).
> 4. In essence, the code that implements dealing with DDLs, would be hosted in
> the catalog table endpoint. The client code would be really thin, and it
> would just invoke the endpoint with the necessary info. The additional thing
> that needs to be done in the endpoint is the validation of authorization to
> prevent unauthorized users from making changes to someone else's
> tables/schemas/etc. For example, one should be able to create a view on a
> table if he has read access on the base table. That mutation on the catalog
> table would be permitted. For changing the schema (adding a new column for
> example), the said user would need write permission on the table... etc etc.
> Thanks [~elserj] for the write-up.
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