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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4198?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16227350#comment-16227350
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Thomas D'Silva commented on PHOENIX-4198:
-----------------------------------------
bq. I'm not sure if we can do it as a part of PHOENIX-672 as how can we give
access to the tables which doesn't exist. For eg: User1 has RX access on the
table and CREATE access on the namespace, but he should not be allowed to
create an Index until all users of the data table have access to the new Index
table.
Once PHOENIX-672 is complete, we should only use GRANT/REVOKE statements to
grant or revoke permissions. The GRANT/REVOKE command will only allow you to
grant or revoke permissions on a table. If the table has any indexes or if it
has a view that has any indexes the same permissions are automatically granted
or revoked from the index tables.
In PhoenixAccessController. preCreateTable, for indexes we need
authorizeOrGrantAccessToUsers() to automatically grant all users/groups who
have any permissions on the parent table the same permissions on the index
table. So I think we don't need the isAutomaticGrantEnabled option.
This change can also be done as part of PHOENIX-672, if you think that makes
more sense.
Related to this, why is automatic grant not allowed for groups?
{code}
+
if(AuthUtil.isGroupPrincipal(Bytes.toString(userPermission.getUser()))){
+ AUDITLOG.warn("Users of GROUP:" +
Bytes.toString(userPermission.getUser())
+ + " will not have following access
" + requireAccess
+ + " to the newly created index " +
toTable
+ + ", Automatic grant is not yet
allowed on Groups");
+ continue;
+ }
{code}
> Remove the need for users to have access to the Phoenix SYSTEM tables to
> create tables
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: PHOENIX-4198
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4198
> Project: Phoenix
> Issue Type: Bug
> Reporter: Ankit Singhal
> Assignee: Ankit Singhal
> Labels: namespaces, security
> Fix For: 4.13.0
>
> Attachments: PHOENIX-4198.patch, PHOENIX-4198_v2.patch,
> PHOENIX-4198_v3.patch, PHOENIX-4198_v4.patch, PHOENIX-4198_v5.patch,
> PHOENIX-4198_v6.patch, PHOENIX-4198_v7.patch
>
>
> Problem statement:-
> A user who doesn't have access to a table should also not be able to modify
> Phoenix Metadata. Currently, every user required to have a write permission
> to SYSTEM tables which is a security concern as they can
> create/alter/drop/corrupt meta data of any other table without proper access
> to the corresponding physical tables.
> [~devaraj] recommended a solution as below.
> 1. A coprocessor endpoint would be implemented and all write accesses to the
> catalog table would have to necessarily go through that. The 'hbase' user
> would own that table. Today, there is MetaDataEndpointImpl that's run on the
> RS where the catalog is hosted, and that could be enhanced to serve the
> purpose we need.
> 2. The regionserver hosting the catalog table would do the needful for all
> catalog updates - creating the mutations as needed, that is.
> 3. The coprocessor endpoint could use Ranger to do necessary authorization
> checks before updating the catalog table. So for example, if a user doesn't
> have authorization to create a table in a certain namespace, or update the
> schema, etc., it can reject such requests outright. Only after successful
> validations, does it perform the operations (physical operations to do with
> creating the table, and updating the catalog table with the necessary
> mutations).
> 4. In essence, the code that implements dealing with DDLs, would be hosted in
> the catalog table endpoint. The client code would be really thin, and it
> would just invoke the endpoint with the necessary info. The additional thing
> that needs to be done in the endpoint is the validation of authorization to
> prevent unauthorized users from making changes to someone else's
> tables/schemas/etc. For example, one should be able to create a view on a
> table if he has read access on the base table. That mutation on the catalog
> table would be permitted. For changing the schema (adding a new column for
> example), the said user would need write permission on the table... etc etc.
> Thanks [~elserj] for the write-up.
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