+1 Thanks for adding the opaque access tokens support, JB! I will take a look at PR.
Yufei On Mon, Nov 9, 2026 at 9:44 AM Alex Dutra via dev <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi JB, > > Thanks for opening the PR, I already approved. > > Q1: to me, it's actually ClaimsLocator that is being "abused" a > little, since it was designed to walk JWT claims, but now it's walking > arbitrary tree-like objects. I think it would be slightly cleaner if > ClaimsLocator was given the object to walk, as opposed to be given a > SecurityIdentity and letting it decide which object should be walked. > But we can improve that as a follow-up, if others agree with me. > > Q2: that's the expected trade-off with opaque tokens. I'm OK with that. > > Thanks, > Alex > > On Mon, Nov 9, 2026 at 5:30 PM Dmitri Bourlatchkov via dev > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > Hi JB, > > > > Thanks for the PR! > > > > IMHO, it is a valuable enhancement to OIDC flows in Polaris in general, > but > > it is always good to see adoption from real users too. > > > > Q1: I tend to think that is is fine to call PrincipalMapper for opaque > > tokens. I even suggested in GH to delegate the whole token type check to > > the specific PrincipalMapper impl., unless we want earlier type checks > for > > optimization reasons. > > > > Q2: I agree that this is a valid trade-off. It is nice to see that > Quarkus > > supports it via its built-in tools. > > > > AFAIK, the introspection calls will actually happen only if the token is > > opaque to begin with. I do not think this change affects the processing > of > > JWT tokens in any way. > > > > Cheers, > > Dmitri. > > > > On Mon, Nov 9, 2026 at 10:49 AM Jean-Baptiste Onofré <[email protected]> > > wrote: > > > > > Hi everyone, > > > > > > Last week I chatted with a Polaris user (a bank in France) that has an > > > issue with IdP support. > > > His IdP (per policy) only issues opaque access tokens. > > > > > > So, I would like to start a discussion about support opaque (non JWT) > > > access tokens when Polaris is configured with external authentication > > > (polaris.authentication.type=external). > > > > > > Today, Polaris only works with IdP issuing JWT access tokens. Quarkus > OIDC > > > already validates opaque tokens through the token introspection > endpoint of > > > the identity provider (RFC 7662), but Polaris drops the resulting > identity: > > > OidcIdentityPreparer only handles identities whose principal is a > > > JsonWebToken, so no PolarisCredential is created and the request is > > > rejected with 401. Note that our documentation suggests providing a > > > custom PrincipalMapper for opaque tokens, but that can't work, as no > mapper > > > is invoked for these identities. > > > > > > I opened a PR to address this: > https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/6026 > > > > > > The change is small and doesn't modify any public interface: > > > - OidcIdentityPreparer also prepares identities carrying a token > > > introspection response. > > > - The default principal mapper resolves the existing > > > polaris.oidc.principal-mapper.*-claim-path settings against the JWT > claims, > > > or against the introspection response for opaque token (for instance > > > "username" or "sub"). The JWT takes precedence, so the behavior is not > > > changed for JWT tokens. > > > - Roles come from the introspection "scope" field and go through the > > > existing polaris.oid.principal-roles-mapper.* settings. > > > > > > I would like your feedback on a couple of points: > > > 1. Custom PrincipalMapper/PrincipalRolesMapper impl will now also be > > > invoked for opaque token identities, whose principal is not a > JsonWebToken. > > > Before, such requests were rejected before reaching any mapper. > > > Implementations blindly casting the principal to JsonWebToken will > have to > > > handle this case. I added an upgrade note in the CHANGELOG about that. > Do > > > you see any concern with this? > > > 2. With opaque tokens, every request triggers a call to the > introspection > > > endpoint unless the Quarkus token cache is enabled > > > (quarkus.oidc.token-cache.max-size, disabled by default). I documented > the > > > trade-off (load on the identity provider vs revoked tokens being > accepted > > > until the cache entry expires) rather than changing the default. Does > it > > > sound good to you? > > > > > > Thoughts? > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > > > Regards > > > JB > > > >
