Hey folks. My original proposal included strict separation of federated principals/roles from native ones. The intention was to ensure that whoever controls role assignment on the third party IdP couldn't be side-stepped by the Polaris service admin adding a native principal to a federated role (they could be very different people).
My personal preference was to consolidate external and federated concepts so that users didn't need to understand three different principal/role types. I agree with all the other points. Mike On Thu, Nov 12, 2026 at 6:04 AM Alex Dutra via dev <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi JB, > > The middle ground you are suggesting makes sense to me. It is somewhat > similar to the "Federated" mode that we've been talking about for a > long time [1], but with 2 differences: only roles are persisted > ahead-of-time, not principals; and principals are not JIT-persisted > (they remain external). > > I think we should move forward with the idea, since it enables the > usage of internal RBAC with external principals. > > One thing that we should maybe settle on is whether this mode requires > the federated flag to be present on the principal role entity? I think > that was Mike Collado's original intent - it would be good if he could > chime in. This restricts which roles can be assumed in this new > credential mode. > > To your questions: > > 1. Naming and config shape: a third credential-mode value is OK, > although maybe we can reshape the enum names and adopt the "federated" > terminology for this new use case? E.g. internal | federated | > external. > 2. Unknown roles: ignored is fine imho. > 3. PRINCIPAL_ROLE:ALL: reject is imho the only choice; we cannot grant > every possible principal role available. > 4. #5439 is imho orthogonal: resolveAll() should never be called in > external or external-with-internal-roles mode; as long as it doesn't, > it should work with the new mode. IOW I don't think the new mode > requires a synthetic caller principal entity. > 5. Trust model: I'm fine with that: role attribution is the IDPs > responsibility, and RBAC is Polaris'. I'd note that this model still > requires principal roles to be synchronized between IDP and Polaris > before the principal can actually be used. This is a limitation that > should be documented. > > Thanks, > Alex > > [1]: > https://docs.google.com/document/d/1VSoN1-QsAJGaM40oWTxeLIoYTp-XlfQM9nG-jqfb_-E/edit > ? > > On Thu, Nov 12, 2026 at 1:50 PM Jean-Baptiste Onofré <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > Hi folks, > > > > Following an informal "Polaris users discussion" I had last week in > France, > > a couple of users shared a common use case that we currently do not > support. > > > > Let me share the context :) > > With credential-mode=external, a principal is authenticated entirely from > > its token: it doesn't need to exist in Polaris, so there's nothing to > sync > > from the IdP. But its roles are taken verbatim from the token and have no > > grants in the metastore. So this mode requires an external authorizer > (OPA, > > Ranger), and startup is refused with the default authorizer. > > > > The users have asked for a middle ground. The IdP stays the source of > truth > > for users and their group or role membership. But they want Polaris RBAC > > (principal roles, catalog roles and grants, managed with the Management > > API) to remain the source of truth for authorization, without deploying > an > > external authorizer. > > > > Today, the only way to get that is internal credential mode. There, every > > principal and every principal-role assignment must exist in Polaris, and > > the token can only activate roles that are already granted. In practice, > > that means syncing users and group membership from the IdP. This is a bit > > similar to the use case discussed in #441 ("Federated Users and Federated > > Roles"). > > > > I would like to propose a third credential mode: > > polaris.authentication.credential-mode=external-with-internal-roles > > > > In this mode: > > - As with external principals, the caller is authenticated from the token > > only. There is no principal lookup, and principals are never created in > > Polaris. > > - The roles emitted by the role mapper name principal roles managed in > > Polaris, using the usual PRINCIPAL_ROLE:<name> convention. Each existing > > principal role is activated, along with the catalog roles granted to it. > > Roles that don't exist in Polaris are ignored. > > - Role membership comes from the token. Principal roles are never > assigned > > to external principals in Polaris. > > - The default authorizer works. As with external principals, the > > authentication type must not be internal. > > - PRINCIPAL_ROLE:ALL is rejected (401), since an external principal has > no > > grants to expand. > > - In mixed authentication, tokens issued by Polaris itself still resolve > to > > internal principals, as today. > > > > Here's an example: the IdP group "polaris_analyst" maps to the Polaris > > principal role "analyst": > > > > polaris.authentication.type=external > > polaris.authentication.credential-mode=external-with-internal-roles > > polaris.oidc.principal-mapper.name-claim-path=preferred_username > > quarkus.oidc.roles.role-claim-path=groups > > polaris.oidc.principal-roles-mapper.filter=polaris_.* > > polaris.oidc.principal-roles-mapper.mappings[0].regex=polaris_(.*) > > > > > polaris.oidc.principal-roles-mapper.mappings[0].replacement=PRINCIPAL_ROLE:$1 > > > > Administrators are simply users whose roles map to the service_admin > > principal role created at bootstrap. > > > > I created a draft PR to illustrate the impl: > > https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/6066 > > > > The change is small and doesn't touch the PolarisAuthorizer SPI or > > PolarisCredential. It adds a new CredentialMode value and a new > > INTERNAL_PRINCIPAL_ROLES attribute key in PolarisPrincipalAttributes. > With > > that attribute set, the Resolver loads an external principal's roles by > > name from the metastore, with their grants, instead of creating stand-in > > roles, so the default authorizer works unchanged. > > > > Since an external principal's name is asserted by the IdP, the PR also > > makes sure an external principal is never treated as the root principal, > > whatever its name. The details are in the PR description. > > > > I have a few open questions for you: > > 1. Naming and config shape: a third credential-mode value (as I propose > in > > the PR) or a separate option, e.g. > > polaris.authentication.external-principal-roles=internal|external? > > 2. Unknown roles: should roles that don't exist in Polaris be ignored (my > > current proposal which tolerates unrelated IdP groups) or rejected? > > 3. PRINCIPAL_ROLE:ALL: reject (my current proposal) or ignore? > > 4. #5439 plans to remove the stand-in principal and roles from the > > Resolver. This mode still needs a caller principal, because the default > > authorizer calls resolveAll(). I think the two are compatible, but it > > should be taken into account there. > > 5. Trust model: the IdP decides who holds which principal role, including > > service_admin. That is inherent to the feature and documented, with a > > recommendation to restrict roles using the role mapper filter. I'm > > interested in other suggestions. > > > > Thoughts? Feedback is welcome on this thread or the PR. > > > > Thanks! > > > > Regards > > JB >
