Hey folks.

My original proposal included strict separation of federated
principals/roles from native ones. The intention was to ensure that whoever
controls role assignment on the third party IdP couldn't be side-stepped by
the Polaris service admin adding a native principal to a federated role
(they could be very different people).

My personal preference was to consolidate external and federated concepts
so that users didn't need to understand three different principal/role
types.

I agree with all the other points.

Mike

On Thu, Nov 12, 2026 at 6:04 AM Alex Dutra via dev <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Hi JB,
>
> The middle ground you are suggesting makes sense to me. It is somewhat
> similar to the "Federated" mode that we've been talking about for a
> long time [1], but with 2 differences: only roles are persisted
> ahead-of-time, not principals; and principals are not JIT-persisted
> (they remain external).
>
> I think we should move forward with the idea, since it enables the
> usage of internal RBAC with external principals.
>
> One thing that we should maybe settle on is whether this mode requires
> the federated flag to be present on the principal role entity? I think
> that was Mike Collado's original intent - it would be good if he could
> chime in. This restricts which roles can be assumed in this new
> credential mode.
>
> To your questions:
>
> 1. Naming and config shape: a third credential-mode value is OK,
> although maybe we can reshape the enum names and adopt the "federated"
> terminology for this new use case? E.g. internal | federated |
> external.
> 2. Unknown roles: ignored is fine imho.
> 3. PRINCIPAL_ROLE:ALL: reject is imho the only choice; we cannot grant
> every possible principal role available.
> 4. #5439 is imho orthogonal: resolveAll() should never be called in
> external or external-with-internal-roles mode; as long as it doesn't,
> it should work with the new mode. IOW I don't think the new mode
> requires a synthetic caller principal entity.
> 5. Trust model: I'm fine with that: role attribution is the IDPs
> responsibility, and RBAC is Polaris'. I'd note that this model still
> requires principal roles to be synchronized between IDP and Polaris
> before the principal can actually be used. This is a limitation that
> should be documented.
>
> Thanks,
> Alex
>
> [1]:
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1VSoN1-QsAJGaM40oWTxeLIoYTp-XlfQM9nG-jqfb_-E/edit
> ?
>
> On Thu, Nov 12, 2026 at 1:50 PM Jean-Baptiste Onofré <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> >
> > Hi folks,
> >
> > Following an informal "Polaris users discussion" I had last week in
> France,
> > a couple of users shared a common use case that we currently do not
> support.
> >
> > Let me share the context :)
> > With credential-mode=external, a principal is authenticated entirely from
> > its token: it doesn't need to exist in Polaris, so there's nothing to
> sync
> > from the IdP. But its roles are taken verbatim from the token and have no
> > grants in the metastore. So this mode requires an external authorizer
> (OPA,
> > Ranger), and startup is refused with the default authorizer.
> >
> > The users have asked for a middle ground. The IdP stays the source of
> truth
> > for users and their group or role membership. But they want Polaris RBAC
> > (principal roles, catalog roles and grants, managed with the Management
> > API) to remain the source of truth for authorization, without deploying
> an
> > external authorizer.
> >
> > Today, the only way to get that is internal credential mode. There, every
> > principal and every principal-role assignment must exist in Polaris, and
> > the token can only activate roles that are already granted. In practice,
> > that means syncing users and group membership from the IdP. This is a bit
> > similar to the use case discussed in #441 ("Federated Users and Federated
> > Roles").
> >
> > I would like to propose a third credential mode:
> > polaris.authentication.credential-mode=external-with-internal-roles
> >
> > In this mode:
> > - As with external principals, the caller is authenticated from the token
> > only. There is no principal lookup, and principals are never created in
> > Polaris.
> > - The roles emitted by the role mapper name principal roles managed in
> > Polaris, using the usual PRINCIPAL_ROLE:<name> convention. Each existing
> > principal role is activated, along with the catalog roles granted to it.
> > Roles that don't exist in Polaris are ignored.
> > - Role membership comes from the token. Principal roles are never
> assigned
> > to external principals in Polaris.
> > - The default authorizer works. As with external principals, the
> > authentication type must not be internal.
> > - PRINCIPAL_ROLE:ALL is rejected (401), since an external principal has
> no
> > grants to expand.
> > - In mixed authentication, tokens issued by Polaris itself still resolve
> to
> > internal principals, as today.
> >
> > Here's an example: the IdP group "polaris_analyst" maps to the Polaris
> > principal role "analyst":
> >
> >   polaris.authentication.type=external
> >   polaris.authentication.credential-mode=external-with-internal-roles
> >   polaris.oidc.principal-mapper.name-claim-path=preferred_username
> >   quarkus.oidc.roles.role-claim-path=groups
> >   polaris.oidc.principal-roles-mapper.filter=polaris_.*
> >   polaris.oidc.principal-roles-mapper.mappings[0].regex=polaris_(.*)
> >
> >
> polaris.oidc.principal-roles-mapper.mappings[0].replacement=PRINCIPAL_ROLE:$1
> >
> > Administrators are simply users whose roles map to the service_admin
> > principal role created at bootstrap.
> >
> > I created a draft PR to illustrate the impl:
> > https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/6066
> >
> > The change is small and doesn't touch the PolarisAuthorizer SPI or
> > PolarisCredential. It adds a new CredentialMode value and a new
> > INTERNAL_PRINCIPAL_ROLES attribute key in PolarisPrincipalAttributes.
> With
> > that attribute set, the Resolver loads an external principal's roles by
> > name from the metastore, with their grants, instead of creating stand-in
> > roles, so the default authorizer works unchanged.
> >
> > Since an external principal's name is asserted by the IdP, the PR also
> > makes sure an external principal is never treated as the root principal,
> > whatever its name. The details are in the PR description.
> >
> > I have a few open questions for you:
> > 1. Naming and config shape: a third credential-mode value (as I propose
> in
> > the PR) or a separate option, e.g.
> > polaris.authentication.external-principal-roles=internal|external?
> > 2. Unknown roles: should roles that don't exist in Polaris be ignored (my
> > current proposal which tolerates unrelated IdP groups) or rejected?
> > 3. PRINCIPAL_ROLE:ALL: reject (my current proposal) or ignore?
> > 4. #5439 plans to remove the stand-in principal and roles from the
> > Resolver. This mode still needs a caller principal, because the default
> > authorizer calls resolveAll(). I think the two are compatible, but it
> > should be taken into account there.
> > 5. Trust model: the IdP decides who holds which principal role, including
> > service_admin. That is inherent to the feature and documented, with a
> > recommendation to restrict roles using the role mapper filter. I'm
> > interested in other suggestions.
> >
> > Thoughts? Feedback is welcome on this thread or the PR.
> >
> > Thanks!
> >
> > Regards
> > JB
>

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