Thanks for the explanations everyone! And a blog post sounds like a great idea.
On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 17:50, Mingshen Sun <ms...@apache.org> wrote: > > BTW, maybe we can write a blog about the implication of recent side > channel attacks in SGX. But we need some time to survey this problem > and collect enough materials. > > On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 3:18 PM Mingshen Sun <ms...@apache.org> wrote: > > > > Hi Matt, > > > > Thanks for bringing up this issue. Regardless of this specific attack > > itself, let me answer another frequently asked question about > > supporting other hardware enclaves. > > > > Actually, we have investigated other hardware enclaves for a long > > time. The following are commonly mentioned hardware TEE > > implementations: > > > > - Intel SGX > > - AMD SEV > > - ARM TrustZone > > - RISC-V Keystone > > > > From our experience, Intel SGX provides better security guarantees > > memory encryption/integrity. Also it is more mature in terms of > > ecosystem including toolchains, documents, community, etc. Sadly, > > because of various reasons, they all somehow suffer from side channel > > attacks. Luckly, there are mitigation methods for these attacks. > > > > To answer the question, yes, we do want to support other hardware TEE > > implementations and provide different choices for users/developers. I > > believe as the time goes on, other TEE implementations will become > > mature eventually. Before that, we plan to spend more time on > > implementing the platform itself: providing better interfaces, > > improving functionalities of services, defining the work flow, etc. In > > the meantime, we should also design the system with better > > abstraction with layers so that once things are ready, we can support > > other platforms. > > > > Best, > > Mingshen Sun > > > > On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 1:50 PM Yu Ding <din...@apache.org> wrote: > > > > > > From what I understand, SGAxe is still utilizing TSX to leak data from > > > LFB. > > > It's not a problem of SGX, but a problem of TSX. TSX breaks the security > > > guarantees provided by SGX, or VMX. > > > > > > The TSX problem is not limited to attacking SGX, but also stealing memory > > > from Dom0 in Xen, or memory from the kernel of Host OS. To solve this > > > problem, TSX needs to be completely removed/disabled. It's a long-existing > > > problem. Intel tried to remove TSX from a couple of commercial SKUs but > > > haven't done it completely. > > > > > > Best, > > > Yu > > > > > > On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 7:43 AM Matt Sicker <boa...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > https://cacheoutattack.com/ > > > > > > > > With all these practical attacks in place for Intel (and AMD to a > > > > different extent), what do you think the future of SGX and its > > > > competitors will look like? Are there plans on supporting other > > > > hardware enclaves that may be more secure (if they exist)? > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Matt Sicker <boa...@gmail.com> > > > > > > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscr...@teaclave.apache.org > > > > For additional commands, e-mail: dev-h...@teaclave.apache.org > > > > > > > > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscr...@teaclave.apache.org > For additional commands, e-mail: dev-h...@teaclave.apache.org > -- Matt Sicker <boa...@gmail.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscr...@teaclave.apache.org For additional commands, e-mail: dev-h...@teaclave.apache.org
