coheigea opened a new pull request, #772: URL: https://github.com/apache/ws-wss4j/pull/772
SamlAssertionValidator cached the ID of an Assertion with a OneTimeUse Condition before validating it against its profile and before verifying trust in its signing key. As SAMLTokenProcessor only checks the signature against the key the Assertion itself carries, an attacker could send an Assertion signed by any key with the ID of a genuine one: it was rejected, but its ID had been cached, so the genuine Assertion was then rejected as a replay. Check OneTimeUse last in both engines. The streaming engine already trusts the signing key before the validator runs, so there this only moves the check after the profile validation. Document the remaining case, an unsigned Assertion, in the threat model. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at: [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For additional commands, e-mail: [email protected]
