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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/ZOOKEEPER-236?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=15927528#comment-15927528
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Powell Molleti commented on ZOOKEEPER-236:
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Hi Abe,
{quote}
bq. I do not think it mentions this should be not be done at cert verification
time nor should we allow exchange of application bits when the certificate is
not what we expected it to be.
So the issue is more zookeeper specific I think. Imagine the case where, and I
know this is very contrived but I think the principal is valid, we have 3 zk
servers all running on the same host with different ports. We have 3 dns
records pointing to this machine with different names, say zk1, zk2, and zk3.
Each zkX has a certificate with the zkX common name. Our zookeeper
configuration identifies these servers by the correct name server.1=zk1... When
one of these servers connects to the server socket on the other I do not think
it is possible for the "server" to tell which zkX connected until the sid is
read from the socket unless we want to start doing reverse dns lookups. I would
rather just use the hostname we already know about. That is why I think we
cannot do hostname verification in the trust manager. Or you could argue that
we only need hostname verification for the "client", but I would rather have it
both ways. Please let me know if I am missing something.
{quote}
If multiple servers have certs with the same subjectAltName entry of type
dNSName and that is indeed is how the CA signed them then it should be ok from
TLS perspective, since we trust the CA, we trust any server signed by the CA
and we match the hostname(i.e we trust DNS lookup or we trust the config
provided). We do not have to verify the specific host since it is sufficient to
verify that it is one of the valid hosts, this is secure.
Take a case where if someone can subvert the CA get signed by it for the same
domain and subvert DNS then they might as well try few sids starting from zero
before ZK lets the server connect.
Hostname verification does not apply to self-signed certs. I am quite skeptical
about the need for hostname verification in private CA (enterprise setting)
too. We should probably have it off by default and let the admin turn it on.
{quote}
bq. I would like to keep the BC helper code
What do you mean by bc helper code?
{quote}
BC is bouncy castle.
Also wanted to ask you if we could make the all sockets BufferedSocket by
default rather then making that conditional on port unification configuration.
I need to restore backward compatibility to X509Util, I removed the public
statics that were marked deprecated, probably cannot do that just yet?.
thanks
Powell.
> SSL Support for Atomic Broadcast protocol
> -----------------------------------------
>
> Key: ZOOKEEPER-236
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/ZOOKEEPER-236
> Project: ZooKeeper
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: quorum, server
> Reporter: Benjamin Reed
> Assignee: Abraham Fine
> Priority: Minor
>
> We should have the ability to use SSL to authenticate and encrypt the traffic
> between ZooKeeper servers. For the most part this is a very easy change. We
> would probably only want to support this for TCP based leader elections.
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