Hi Dandan, On 9/18/19 5:05 AM, Dandan Bi wrote: > For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, > the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid > EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. > This follows UEFI Spec. > > But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer > the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION > like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. > > This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly > for the callers in UefiBootManagerLib which don't have the policy to defer > the execution of the image. > > Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.w...@intel.com> > Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a...@intel.com> > Cc: Ray Ni <ray...@intel.com> > Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao....@intel.com> > Cc: Liming Gao <liming....@intel.com> > Cc: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com> > REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992 > Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan...@intel.com> > --- > MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c | 9 +++++++++ > .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c | 11 ++++++++++- > MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c | 11 ++++++++++- > 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c > index 952033fc82..760d7647b8 100644 > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c > @@ -1859,10 +1859,19 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot ( > if (FilePath != NULL) { > FreePool (FilePath); > } > > if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > + // > + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an > ImageHandle was created > + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be > started right now. > + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an > image, we should > + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. > + // > + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { > + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
OK > + } > // > // Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the > failure to load boot option > // > BmReportLoadFailure (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status); > BootOption->Status = Status; > diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c > index 07592f8ebd..af47b787d1 100644 > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c > @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ > /** @file > Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing > load options. > > -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> > +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> > (C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR> > SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent > > **/ > > @@ -1409,10 +1409,19 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption ( > FileSize, > &ImageHandle > ); > FreePool (FileBuffer); > What about: if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > + // > + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an > ImageHandle was created > + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be > started right now. > + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an > image, we should > + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. > + // > + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { > + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); > + } - if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { } else { > Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, > &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo); > ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); > > ImageInfo->LoadOptionsSize = LoadOption->OptionalDataSize; > diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c > index 6b8fb4d924..833e38c6fe 100644 > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c > @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@ > /** @file > Misc library functions. > > -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> > +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> > (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR> > SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent > > **/ > > @@ -491,10 +491,19 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages ( > ImageDevicePath, > NULL, > 0, > &ImageHandle > ); > + // > + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an > ImageHandle was created > + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be > started right now. > + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an > image, we should > + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. > + // > + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { > + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); > + } > if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { Ditto. The logic is correct, but the code workflow is now odd. > LoadCount++; > // > // Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for > // a 5 Minute period > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#47913): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/47913 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/34184008/21656 Group Owner: devel+ow...@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [arch...@mail-archive.com] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-