For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
This follows UEFI Spec.

But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.

This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
for the callers in ShellPkg which don't have the policy to defer the
execution of the image.

Cc: Ray Ni <ray...@intel.com>
Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao....@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <phi...@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan...@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao....@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <phi...@redhat.com>
---
 ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c           |  9 +++++++++
 .../Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c   | 11 ++++++++++-
 ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c    | 11 ++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c 
b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
index 6909f29441..4d5a5668aa 100644
--- a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
+++ b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
@@ -643,10 +643,19 @@ ProcessManFile(
       goto Done;
     }
     DevPath = 
ShellInfoObject.NewEfiShellProtocol->GetDevicePathFromFilePath(CmdFilePathName);
     Status      = gBS->LoadImage(FALSE, gImageHandle, DevPath, NULL, 0, 
&CmdFileImgHandle);
     if(EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+      //
+      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an 
ImageHandle was created
+      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be 
started right now.
+      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an 
image, we should
+      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid the resource 
leak.
+      //
+      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+        gBS->UnloadImage (CmdFileImgHandle);
+      }
       *HelpText = NULL;
       goto Done;
     }
     Status = gBS->OpenProtocol(
                     CmdFileImgHandle,
diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c 
b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
index 1b169d0d3c..5b6cba17f3 100644
--- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
+++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /** @file
   Main file for LoadPciRom shell Debug1 function.
 
   (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
-  Copyright (c) 2005 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+  Copyright (c) 2005 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
   SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
 
 **/
 
 #include "UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib.h"
@@ -332,10 +332,19 @@ LoadEfiDriversFromRomImage (
                         ImageBuffer,
                         ImageLength,
                         &ImageHandle
                        );
           if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+            //
+            // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an 
ImageHandle was created
+            // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not 
be started right now.
+            // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of 
an image, we should
+            // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource 
leak.
+            //
+            if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+              gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+            }
             ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN 
(STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_FAIL), gShellDebug1HiiHandle, L"loadpcirom", FileName, 
ImageIndex);
 //            PrintToken (STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_IMAGE_ERROR), 
HiiHandle, ImageIndex, Status);
           } else {
             Status = gBS->StartImage (ImageHandle, NULL, NULL);
             if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c 
b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
index 6a94b48c86..b6e7c952fa 100644
--- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
+++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /** @file
   Main file for attrib shell level 2 function.
 
   (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
-  Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+  Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
   SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
 
 **/
 
 #include "UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib.h"
@@ -110,10 +110,19 @@ LoadDriver(
     NULL,
     0,
     &LoadedDriverHandle);
 
   if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+    //
+    // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an 
ImageHandle was created
+    // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be 
started right now.
+    // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an 
image, we should
+    // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+    //
+    if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+      gBS->UnloadImage (LoadedDriverHandle);
+    }
     ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOAD_NOT_IMAGE), 
gShellLevel2HiiHandle, FileName, Status);
   } else {
     //
     // Make sure it is a driver image
     //
-- 
2.18.0.windows.1


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