I want to ask your one question: are you sure that every mother board which
deliver to customer will enable the secure boot mode?
I just emphasize that I want to make sure that the device firmware come from
the device vendor.
Thanks for your effort, the patch is good, I just think it is not suitable for
common solution.
But if your customer indeed want it, you can add it to your customization code.
Thanks
Guomin
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Liming Sun <l...@mellanox.com>
> Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 8:47 PM
> To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Jiang, Guomin <guomin.ji...@intel.com>; Xu,
> Wei6 <wei6...@intel.com>; Gao, Liming <liming....@intel.com>; Kinney,
> Michael D <michael.d.kin...@intel.com>
> Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.bro...@microsoft.com>
> Subject: RE: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule
> verification with secure boot keys
>
> Thanks Guomin.
>
> I still have one question. Let's assume we're the device vendor and we let
> customer to enroll their keys. Once the keys are enrolled, the device will be
> in secure boot mode. Are you saying that the end user could "have the ability
> to enroll their DB without too many effort" even after the secure boot has
> been enabled already?
>
> Please correct me if I misunderstood it.
>
> - Liming
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: devel@edk2.groups.io <devel@edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of
> Guomin
> > Jiang via groups.io
> > Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 3:33 AM
> > To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Liming Sun <l...@mellanox.com>; Xu, Wei6
> > <wei6...@intel.com>; Gao, Liming <liming....@intel.com>; Kinney,
> > Michael D <michael.d.kin...@intel.com>
> > Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.bro...@microsoft.com>
> > Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule
> > verification with secure boot keys
> >
> > Liming,
> >
> > The end user have the ability to enroll their DB without too many effort.
> >
> > And I think some end user also have the ability to get insecure firmware
> which not from the device vendor.
> >
> > I suggest that tell the device vendor that it is critical that set the
> PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr rather than decrease the security.
> >
> > Best Regards
> > Guomin
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: devel@edk2.groups.io <devel@edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of
> > > Liming Sun
> > > Sent: Tuesday, June 30, 2020 11:33 AM
> > > To: Jiang, Guomin <guomin.ji...@intel.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io;
> > > Xu,
> > > Wei6 <wei6...@intel.com>; Gao, Liming <liming....@intel.com>;
> > > Kinney, Michael D <michael.d.kin...@intel.com>
> > > Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.bro...@microsoft.com>
> > > Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule
> > > verification with secure boot keys
> > >
> > > Thanks Guomin for the comments!
> > >
> > > Below is the main scenario for the proposed change:
> > >
> > > - Device Manufacturer provides the devices with UEFI preinstalled in
> > > non- secure state and no hard-coded keys (
> PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr).
> > >
> > > - Customer (not End-User) enrolls their own keys in trusted
> > > environment before delivering to End User.
> > > This capsule approach can be used for large deployment without
> > > involving any private keys.
> > >
> > > Yes, I do agree that once it's delivered to End User it won't be
> > > considered secure.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Liming
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Jiang, Guomin <guomin.ji...@intel.com>
> > > > Sent: Sunday, June 28, 2020 11:18 PM
> > > > To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Liming Sun <l...@mellanox.com>; Xu, Wei6
> > > > <wei6...@intel.com>; Gao, Liming <liming....@intel.com>; Kinney,
> > > > Michael D <michael.d.kin...@intel.com>
> > > > Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.bro...@microsoft.com>
> > > > Subject: RE: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule
> > > > verification with secure boot keys
> > > >
> > > > I think it have some vulnerability, the case as below.
> > > >
> > > > 1. Untrusted End User enroll the new DB key -> sign the untrusted
> > > > device firmware -> flash the untrusted device firmware -> the
> > > > system will
> > > become unsafe.
> > > >
> > > > I think the end user is untrusted and we need to make sure only
> > > > few person
> > > can have the privilege.
> > > >
> > > > Best Regards
> > > > Guomin
> > > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: devel@edk2.groups.io <devel@edk2.groups.io> On Behalf Of
> > > > > Liming Sun
> > > > > Sent: Saturday, June 20, 2020 1:48 AM
> > > > > To: Xu, Wei6 <wei6...@intel.com>; Gao, Liming
> > > > > <liming....@intel.com>; Kinney, Michael D
> > > > > <michael.d.kin...@intel.com>
> > > > > Cc: Liming Sun <l...@mellanox.com>; devel@edk2.groups.io; Sean
> > > > > Brogan <sean.bro...@microsoft.com>
> > > > > Subject: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule
> > > > > verification with secure boot keys
> > > > >
> > > > > This commit enhances the FmpDevicePkg package to optionally
> > > > > verify capsule with the secure boot keys when
> > > > > PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr is not set and the new PCD
> > > > > variable PcdFmpDeviceAllowSecureBootKeys is configured. Below is
> > > > > the check
> > > logic:
> > > > > - Pass if verified with PK key, or PK key not set yet;
> > > > > - Deny if verified with the DBX keys;
> > > > > - Verified it against the DB keys;
> > > > >
> > > > > One purpose for this change is to auto-deploy the UEFI secure
> > > > > boot keys with UEFI capsule. Initially it's done in trusted
> > > > > environment.
> > > > > Once secure boot is enabled, the same keys will be used to
> > > > > verify the signed capsules as well for further updates.
> > > > >
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Liming Sun <l...@mellanox.com>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > FmpDevicePkg/FmpDevicePkg.dec | 6 +++
> > > > > FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.c | 109
> > > > > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > > > > FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.h | 1 +
> > > > > FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.inf | 3 ++
> > > > > FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxeLib.inf | 1 +
> > > > > 5 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDevicePkg.dec
> > > > > b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDevicePkg.dec index cab63f5..3aeb89c 100644
> > > > > --- a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDevicePkg.dec
> > > > > +++ b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDevicePkg.dec
> > > > > @@ -126,6 +126,12 @@
> > > > > # @Prompt Firmware Device Image Type ID
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceImageTypeIdGuid|{0}|VOID
> > > > > *|0x40000010
> > > > >
> > > > > + ## This option is used to verify the capsule using secure
> > > > > + boot keys if the # PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr is not
> configured.
> > > > > + In such case, the check # will pass if secure boot hasn't
> > > > > + been enabled
> > > yet.
> > > > > + # @A flag to tell whether to use secure boot keys when
> > > > > PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr is not set.
> > > > > +
> > > > > +
> > > > >
> > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceAllowSecureBootKeys|0x0|
> > > > > UINT8|
> > > > > + 0x40000012
> > > > > +
> > > > > [PcdsFixedAtBuild, PcdsPatchableInModule, PcdsDynamic,
> > > PcdsDynamicEx]
> > > > > ## One or more PKCS7 certificates used to verify a firmware
> > > > > device
> > > capsule
> > > > > # update image. Encoded using the Variable-Length Opaque
> > > > > Data format of RFC diff --git a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.c
> > > > > b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.c index 5884177..6f82aee 100644
> > > > > --- a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.c
> > > > > +++ b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.c
> > > > > @@ -682,6 +682,102 @@ GetAllHeaderSize (
> > > > > return CalculatedSize;
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > +EFI_STATUS
> > > > > +CheckTheImageWithSecureBootVariable (
> > > > > + IN CONST CHAR16 *Name,
> > > > > + IN CONST EFI_GUID *Guid,
> > > > > + IN CONST VOID *Image,
> > > > > + IN UINTN ImageSize
> > > > > + )
> > > > > +{
> > > > > + EFI_STATUS Status;
> > > > > + VOID *Data;
> > > > > + UINTN Length;
> > > > > + EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
> > > > > + EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertData;
> > > > > + UINTN CertCount;
> > > > > + UINTN Index;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + Status = GetVariable2 (Name, Guid, &Data, &Length); if
> > > > > + (EFI_ERROR
> > > > > + (Status)) {
> > > > > + return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
> > > > > + }
> > > > > +
> > > > > + CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data; while ((Length > 0)
> > > > > + && (Length >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
> > > > > + if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid))
> {
> > > > > + CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList +
> > > > > + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
> > > > > + CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof
> > > > > + (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)
> > > -
> > > > > + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) /
> > > > > + CertList->SignatureSize;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
> > > > > + Status = AuthenticateFmpImage (
> > > > > + (EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_AUTHENTICATION *)Image,
> > > > > + ImageSize,
> > > > > + CertData->SignatureData,
> > > > > + CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)
> > > > > + );
> > > > > + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status))
> > > > > + goto Done;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + CertData = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertData +
> > > > > + CertList-
> > > > > >SignatureSize);
> > > > > + }
> > > > > + }
> > > > > +
> > > > > + Length -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
> > > > > + CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList +
> > > > > + CertList->SignatureListSize); }
> > > > > +
> > > > > +Done:
> > > > > + FreePool (Data);
> > > > > + return Status;
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +
> > > > > +EFI_STATUS
> > > > > +CheckTheImageWithSecureBootKeys (
> > > > > + IN CONST VOID *Image,
> > > > > + IN UINTN ImageSize
> > > > > + )
> > > > > +{
> > > > > + EFI_STATUS Status;
> > > > > +
> > > > > + // PK check.
> > > > > + Status = CheckTheImageWithSecureBootVariable(
> > > > > + EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
> > > > > + &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
> > > > > + Image,
> > > > > + ImageSize
> > > > > + );
> > > > > + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status) || Status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
> > > > > + // Return SUCCESS if verified by PK key or PK key not configured.
> > > > > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpDxe: Verified capsule with PK
> key.\n"));
> > > > > + return EFI_SUCCESS;
> > > > > + }
> > > > > +
> > > > > + // DBX check.
> > > > > + Status = CheckTheImageWithSecureBootVariable(
> > > > > + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,
> > > > > + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
> > > > > + Image,
> > > > > + ImageSize
> > > > > + );
> > > > > + if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> > > > > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpDxe: Reject capsule with DBX
> key.\n"));
> > > > > + return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; }
> > > > > +
> > > > > + // DB check.
> > > > > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpDxe: Verify capsule with DB
> > > > > +key.\n"));
> > > > > + Status = CheckTheImageWithSecureBootVariable(
> > > > > + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
> > > > > + &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
> > > > > + Image,
> > > > > + ImageSize
> > > > > + );
> > > > > + return Status;
> > > > > +}
> > > > > +
> > > > > /**
> > > > > Checks if the firmware image is valid for the device.
> > > > >
> > > > > @@ -728,6 +824,7 @@ CheckTheImage (
> > > > > UINT8 *PublicKeyDataXdrEnd;
> > > > > EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_DEP *Dependencies;
> > > > > UINT32 DependenciesSize;
> > > > > + UINT8 AllowSecureBootKeys;
> > > > >
> > > > > Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
> > > > > RawSize = 0;
> > > > > @@ -782,9 +879,15 @@ CheckTheImage (
> > > > > PublicKeyDataXdr = PcdGetPtr
> (PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr);
> > > > > PublicKeyDataXdrEnd = PublicKeyDataXdr + PcdGetSize
> > > > > (PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr);
> > > > >
> > > > > - if (PublicKeyDataXdr == NULL || (PublicKeyDataXdr ==
> > > > > PublicKeyDataXdrEnd)) {
> > > > > - DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FmpDxe(%s): Invalid certificate, skipping
> it.\n",
> > > > > mImageIdName));
> > > > > - Status = EFI_ABORTED;
> > > > > + if (PublicKeyDataXdr == NULL || (PublicKeyDataXdrEnd -
> > > > > + PublicKeyDataXdr
> > > > > < sizeof (UINT32))) {
> > > > > + AllowSecureBootKeys = PcdGet8
> > > (PcdFmpDeviceAllowSecureBootKeys);
> > > > > + if (AllowSecureBootKeys) {
> > > > > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "FmpDxe: Use secure boot certs.\n"));
> > > > > + Status = CheckTheImageWithSecureBootKeys (Image,
> ImageSize);
> > > > > + } else {
> > > > > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "FmpDxe(%s): Invalid certificate,
> > > > > + skipping
> > > > > it.\n", mImageIdName));
> > > > > + Status = EFI_ABORTED;
> > > > > + }
> > > > > } else {
> > > > > //
> > > > > // Try each key from PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr diff
> > > > > --git a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.h
> > > > > b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.h
> > > index
> > > > > 30754de..72a6ce6 100644
> > > > > --- a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.h
> > > > > +++ b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.h
> > > > > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
> > > > > #include <Protocol/FirmwareManagement.h> #include
> > > > > <Protocol/FirmwareManagementProgress.h>
> > > > > #include <Protocol/VariableLock.h>
> > > > > +#include <Guid/ImageAuthentication.h>
> > > > > #include <Guid/SystemResourceTable.h> #include
> > > > > <Guid/EventGroup.h>
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.inf
> > > > > b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.inf index eeb904a..60b02d4
> 100644
> > > > > --- a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.inf
> > > > > +++ b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxe.inf
> > > > > @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
> > > > >
> > > > > [Guids]
> > > > > gEfiEndOfDxeEventGroupGuid
> > > > > + gEfiCertX509Guid
> > > > > + gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
> > > > >
> > > > > [Protocols]
> > > > > gEdkiiVariableLockProtocolGuid ## CONSUMES
> > > > > @@ -74,6 +76,7 @@
> > > > > gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr
> > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceTestKeySha256Digest
> > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceImageTypeIdGuid
> > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > +
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceAllowSecureBootKeys
> > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTestKeyUsed
> ##
> > > > > SOMETIMES_PRODUCES
> > > > >
> > > > > [Depex]
> > > > > diff --git a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxeLib.inf
> > > > > b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxeLib.inf
> > > > > index 9a93b5e..1308cae 100644
> > > > > --- a/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxeLib.inf
> > > > > +++ b/FmpDevicePkg/FmpDxe/FmpDxeLib.inf
> > > > > @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
> > > > > gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDevicePkcs7CertBufferXdr
> > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > >
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceTestKeySha256Digest
> > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceImageTypeIdGuid
> > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > +
> gFmpDevicePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFmpDeviceAllowSecureBootKeys
> > > > > ## CONSUMES
> > > > > gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdTestKeyUsed
> ##
> > > > > SOMETIMES_PRODUCES
> > > > >
> > > > > [Depex]
> > > > > --
> > > > > 1.8.3.1
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
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