On 08/13/20 13:55, Wenyi Xie wrote: > REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2215 > > There is an integer overflow vulnerability in DxeImageVerificationHandler > function when parsing the PE files attribute certificate table. In cases > where WinCertificate->dwLength is sufficiently large, it's possible to > overflow Offset back to 0 causing an endless loop. > > Check offset inbetween VirtualAddress and VirtualAddress + Size. > Using SafeintLib to do offset addition with result check. > > Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen....@intel.com> > Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.w...@intel.com> > Cc: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Wenyi Xie <xiewen...@huawei.com> > --- > SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf | > 1 + > SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.h | > 1 + > SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | > 111 +++++++++++--------- > 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) > > diff --git > a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf > b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf > index 1e1a639857e0..a7ac4830b3d4 100644 > --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf > +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf > @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ [LibraryClasses] > SecurityManagementLib > PeCoffLib > TpmMeasurementLib > + SafeIntLib > > [Protocols] > gEfiFirmwareVolume2ProtocolGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES > diff --git > a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.h > b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.h > index 17955ff9774c..060273917d5d 100644 > --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.h > +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.h > @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent > #include <Library/DevicePathLib.h> > #include <Library/SecurityManagementLib.h> > #include <Library/PeCoffLib.h> > +#include <Library/SafeIntLib.h> > #include <Protocol/FirmwareVolume2.h> > #include <Protocol/DevicePath.h> > #include <Protocol/BlockIo.h> > diff --git > a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > index 36b87e16d53d..dbc03e28c05b 100644 > --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > @@ -1658,6 +1658,10 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( > EFI_STATUS HashStatus; > EFI_STATUS DbStatus; > BOOLEAN IsFound; > + UINT32 AlignedLength; > + UINT32 Result; > + EFI_STATUS AddStatus; > + BOOLEAN IsAuthDataAssigned; > > SignatureList = NULL; > SignatureListSize = 0; > @@ -1667,6 +1671,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( > Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED; > IsVerified = FALSE; > IsFound = FALSE; > + Result = 0; > > // > // Check the image type and get policy setting. > @@ -1850,9 +1855,10 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( > // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) > from the start of the file. > // > for (OffSet = SecDataDir->VirtualAddress; > - OffSet < (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size); > - OffSet += (WinCertificate->dwLength + ALIGN_SIZE > (WinCertificate->dwLength))) { > + (OffSet >= SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) && (OffSet < > (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size));) { > + IsAuthDataAssigned = FALSE; > WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet); > + AlignedLength = WinCertificate->dwLength + ALIGN_SIZE > (WinCertificate->dwLength);
I disagree with this patch. The primary reason for my disagreement is that the bug report <https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2215#c0> is inexact, and so this patch tries to fix the wrong thing. With edk2 master at commit 65904cdbb33c, it is *not* possible to overflow the OffSet variable to zero with "WinCertificate->dwLength" *purely*, and cause an endless loop. Note that we have (at commit 65904cdbb33c): for (OffSet = SecDataDir->VirtualAddress; OffSet < (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size); OffSet += (WinCertificate->dwLength + ALIGN_SIZE (WinCertificate->dwLength))) { WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet); if ((SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE) || (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) < WinCertificate->dwLength) { break; } The last sub-condition checks whether the Security Data Directory has enough room left for "WinCertificate->dwLength". If not, then we break out of the loop. If we *do* have enough room, that is: (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) >= WinCertificate->dwLength then we have (by adding OffSet to both sides): SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size >= OffSet + WinCertificate->dwLength The left hand side is a known-good UINT32, and so incrementing OffSet (a UINT32) *solely* by "WinCertificate->dwLength" (also a UINT32) does not cause an overflow. Instead, the problem is with the alignment. The "if" statement checks whether we have enough room for "dwLength", but then "OffSet" is advanced by "dwLength" *aligned up* to the next multiple of 8. And that may indeed cause various overflows. Now, the main problem with the present patch is that it does not fix one of those overflows. Namely, consider that "dwLength" is very close to MAX_UINT32 (or even think it's exactly MAX_UINT32). Then aligning it up to the next multiple of 8 will yield 0. In other words, "AlignedLength" will be zero. And when that happens, there's going to be an infinite loop just the same: "OffSet" will not be zero, but it will be *stuck*. The SafeUint32Add() call at the bottom will succeed, but it will not change the value of "OffSet". More at the bottom. > if ((SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) <= sizeof > (WIN_CERTIFICATE) || > (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) < > WinCertificate->dwLength) { > break; > @@ -1872,6 +1878,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( > } > AuthData = PkcsCertData->CertData; > AuthDataSize = PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr); > + IsAuthDataAssigned = TRUE; > + HashStatus = HashPeImageByType (AuthData, AuthDataSize); > } else if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) { > // > // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID which is > described in UEFI Spec. > @@ -1880,72 +1888,75 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( > if (WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength <= > OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData)) { > break; > } > - if (!CompareGuid (&WinCertUefiGuid->CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) { > - continue; > + if (CompareGuid (&WinCertUefiGuid->CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) { > + AuthData = WinCertUefiGuid->CertData; > + AuthDataSize = WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength - > OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData); > + IsAuthDataAssigned = TRUE; > + HashStatus = HashPeImageByType (AuthData, AuthDataSize); > } > - AuthData = WinCertUefiGuid->CertData; > - AuthDataSize = WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength - > OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData); > } else { > if (WinCertificate->dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE)) { > break; > } > - continue; > } > > - HashStatus = HashPeImageByType (AuthData, AuthDataSize); > - if (EFI_ERROR (HashStatus)) { > - continue; > - } > - > - // > - // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in > forbidden database (dbx). > - // > - if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) { > - Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED; > - IsVerified = FALSE; > - break; > - } > - > - // > - // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed > database (db). > - // > - if (!IsVerified) { > - if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) { > - IsVerified = TRUE; > + if (IsAuthDataAssigned && !EFI_ERROR (HashStatus)) { > + // > + // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in > forbidden database (dbx). > + // > + if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) { > + Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED; > + IsVerified = FALSE; > + break; > } > - } > > - // > - // Check the image's hash value. > - // > - DbStatus = IsSignatureFoundInDatabase ( > - EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, > - mImageDigest, > - &mCertType, > - mImageDigestSize, > - &IsFound > - ); > - if (EFI_ERROR (DbStatus) || IsFound) { > - Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND; > - DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but %s > hash of image is found in DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr)); > - IsVerified = FALSE; > - break; > - } > + // > + // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in > allowed database (db). > + // > + if (!IsVerified) { > + if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) { > + IsVerified = TRUE; > + } > + } > > - if (!IsVerified) { > + // > + // Check the image's hash value. > + // > DbStatus = IsSignatureFoundInDatabase ( > - EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, > + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, > mImageDigest, > &mCertType, > mImageDigestSize, > &IsFound > ); > - if (!EFI_ERROR (DbStatus) && IsFound) { > - IsVerified = TRUE; > - } else { > - DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but > signature is not allowed by DB and %s hash of image is not found in > DB/DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr)); > + if (EFI_ERROR (DbStatus) || IsFound) { > + Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FOUND; > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but %s > hash of image is found in DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr)); > + IsVerified = FALSE; > + break; > } > + > + if (!IsVerified) { > + DbStatus = IsSignatureFoundInDatabase ( > + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, > + mImageDigest, > + &mCertType, > + mImageDigestSize, > + &IsFound > + ); > + if (!EFI_ERROR (DbStatus) && IsFound) { > + IsVerified = TRUE; > + } else { > + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "DxeImageVerificationLib: Image is signed but > signature is not allowed by DB and %s hash of image is not found in > DB/DBX.\n", mHashTypeStr)); > + } > + } > + } > + > + AddStatus = SafeUint32Add (OffSet, AlignedLength, &Result); > + if (EFI_ERROR (AddStatus)) { > + break; > } > + OffSet = Result; > } > > if (OffSet != (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size)) { > There are other (smaller) reasons why I dislike this patch: - The "IsAuthDataAssigned" variable is superfluous; we could use the existent "AuthData" variable (with a NULL-check and a NULL-assignment) similarly. - The patch complicates / reorganizes the control flow needlessly. This complication originates from placing the checked "OffSet" increment at the bottom of the loop, which then requires the removal of all the "continue" statements. But we don't need to check-and-increment at the bottom. We can keep the increment inside the "for" statement, only extend the *existent* room check (which I've quoted) to take the alignment into account as well. If there is enough room for the alignment in the security data directory, then that guarantees there won't be a UINT32 overflow either. All in all, I'm proposing the following three patches instead. The first two patches are preparation, the last patch is the fix. Patch#1: > From 11af0a104d34d39bf1b1aab256428ae4edbddd77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com> > Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 19:11:39 +0200 > Subject: [PATCH 1/3] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: extract > SecDataDirEnd, SecDataDirLeft > > The following two quantities: > > SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size > SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet > > are used multiple times in DxeImageVerificationHandler(). Introduce helper > variables for them: "SecDataDirEnd" and "SecDataDirLeft", respectively. > This saves us multiple calculations and significantly simplifies the code. > > Note that all three summands above have type UINT32, therefore the new > variables are also of type UINT32. > > This patch does not change behavior. > > (Note that the code already handles the case when the > > SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size > > UINT32 addition overflows -- namely, in that case, the certificate loop is > never entered, and the corruption check right after the loop fires.) > > Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com> > --- > SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 12 > ++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git > a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > index 36b87e16d53d..8761980c88aa 100644 > --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > @@ -1652,6 +1652,8 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( > UINT8 *AuthData; > UINTN AuthDataSize; > EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *SecDataDir; > + UINT32 SecDataDirEnd; > + UINT32 SecDataDirLeft; > UINT32 OffSet; > CHAR16 *NameStr; > RETURN_STATUS PeCoffStatus; > @@ -1849,12 +1851,14 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( > // "Attribute Certificate Table". > // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) > from the start of the file. > // > + SecDataDirEnd = SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size; > for (OffSet = SecDataDir->VirtualAddress; > - OffSet < (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size); > + OffSet < SecDataDirEnd; > OffSet += (WinCertificate->dwLength + ALIGN_SIZE > (WinCertificate->dwLength))) { > WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet); > - if ((SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) <= sizeof > (WIN_CERTIFICATE) || > - (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) < > WinCertificate->dwLength) { > + SecDataDirLeft = SecDataDirEnd - OffSet; > + if (SecDataDirLeft <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE) || > + SecDataDirLeft < WinCertificate->dwLength) { > break; > } > > @@ -1948,7 +1952,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( > } > } > > - if (OffSet != (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size)) { > + if (OffSet != SecDataDirEnd) { > // > // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certificate table is > corrupted. > // > -- > 2.19.1.3.g30247aa5d201 > Patch#2: > From 72012c065a53582f7df695e7b9730c45f49226c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com> > Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 19:19:06 +0200 > Subject: [PATCH 2/3] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: assign > WinCertificate after size check > > Currently the (SecDataDirLeft <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE)) check only > guards the de-referencing of the "WinCertificate" pointer. It does not > guard the calculation of hte pointer itself: > > WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet); > > This is wrong; if we don't know for sure that we have enough room for a > WIN_CERTIFICATE, then even creating such a pointer, not just > de-referencing it, may invoke undefined behavior. > > Move the pointer calculation after the size check. > > Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com> > --- > SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 8 > +++++--- > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git > a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > index 8761980c88aa..461ed7cfb5ac 100644 > --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > @@ -1855,10 +1855,12 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( > for (OffSet = SecDataDir->VirtualAddress; > OffSet < SecDataDirEnd; > OffSet += (WinCertificate->dwLength + ALIGN_SIZE > (WinCertificate->dwLength))) { > - WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet); > SecDataDirLeft = SecDataDirEnd - OffSet; > - if (SecDataDirLeft <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE) || > - SecDataDirLeft < WinCertificate->dwLength) { > + if (SecDataDirLeft <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE)) { > + break; > + } > + WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet); > + if (SecDataDirLeft < WinCertificate->dwLength) { > break; > } > > -- > 2.19.1.3.g30247aa5d201 > Patch#3: > From 0bbba15b84f8f9f2cdc770a89f418aaec6cfb31e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com> > Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 19:34:33 +0200 > Subject: [PATCH 3/3] SecurityPkg/DxeImageVerificationLib: catch alignment > overflow (CVE-2019-14562) > > The DxeImageVerificationHandler() function currently checks whether > "SecDataDir" has enough room for "WinCertificate->dwLength". However, for > advancing "OffSet", "WinCertificate->dwLength" is aligned to the next > multiple of 8. If "WinCertificate->dwLength" is large enough, the > alignment will return 0, and "OffSet" will be stuck at the same value. > > Check whether "SecDataDir" has room left for both > "WinCertificate->dwLength" and the alignment. > > Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com> > --- > SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c | 4 > +++- > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git > a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > index 461ed7cfb5ac..e38eb981b7a0 100644 > --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c > @@ -1860,7 +1860,9 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler ( > break; > } > WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet); > - if (SecDataDirLeft < WinCertificate->dwLength) { > + if (SecDataDirLeft < WinCertificate->dwLength || > + (SecDataDirLeft - WinCertificate->dwLength < > + ALIGN_SIZE (WinCertificate->dwLength))) { > break; > } > > -- > 2.19.1.3.g30247aa5d201 > If Wenyi and the reviewers are OK with these patches, I can submit them as a standalone patch series. Note that I do not have any reproducer for the issue; the best testing that I could offer would be some light-weight Secure Boot regression tests. Thanks Laszlo -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#64243): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/64243 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/76165658/21656 Group Owner: devel+ow...@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [arch...@mail-archive.com] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
