On Fri, Apr 08, 2016 at 09:09:23AM +0000, Gregory Maxwell wrote:

> The TPM style of remote attest is quite unfriendly to free software.
> It puts basically the entire operating system in the trusted domain,
> and you cannot change even a bit of it without "breaking the seal".
> So if you want any use of remote attest at all, there is a huge swath
> of your system which are are "compelled" under threat of loss of
> access to whatever functionality remote-attest was providing to make
> no modification-- or even, potentially, no upgrade to a very new or
> less common version.

Remote attestation is primarily useful within a single administrative 
domain. Outside that case it's far too easy to subvert (easiest 
approach: simply add a second TPM to your system and program whatever 
PCRs you want), and the privacy concerns remain sufficiently problematic 
that I don't see anybody pushing for it in the near future.

> I think any time invested to make remote attest of any kind work would
> better be spent on support for Intel SGX, which creates limited
> remote-attestable sandboxes which (assuming Intel made no mistakes :)
> ) have strong security and confidentiality regardless of what else is
> running on the system. These sandboxes also have no outside access
> except via limited channels, so (again assuming no mistakes/backdoors
> on Intel's part); and the published security model is stronger (e.g.
> encrypted ram) and more suitable for user-friendly uses (for example,
> it would be straight-forward to use SGX to implement a bitcoin wallet
> that could enforce user specified transfer limits, even against a
> total security compromise of the host-- and if the RA part is as
> usuable as it could be, even prove to third party auditors that your
> keys have these security properties (the RA functionality for SGX is
> not yet documented in public, AFAIK)).

SGX has some interesting properties, but it's unhelpful in the rather 
more common case of "I'm running a bunch of servers and I want to know 
that they're trustworthy before I give them access to resources". 
Rearchitecting a large number of apps into a more SGXy world is a far 
from trivial task.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mj...@srcf.ucam.org
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