V Tue, May 31, 2022 at 04:25:28PM +0200, Alexander Sosedkin napsal(a): > On Tue, May 31, 2022 at 4:09 PM Petr Pisar <ppi...@redhat.com> wrote: > > > > V Tue, May 31, 2022 at 03:51:26PM +0200, Alexander Sosedkin napsal(a): > > > On Tue, May 31, 2022 at 3:45 PM Petr Pisar <ppi...@redhat.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > V Tue, May 31, 2022 at 02:56:56PM +0200, Alexander Sosedkin napsal(a): > > > > > On Tue, May 31, 2022 at 12:28 PM Vitaly Zaitsev via devel > > > > > <devel@lists.fedoraproject.org> wrote: > > > > > > On 31/05/2022 10:21, Petr Pisar wrote: > > > > > > > Not in current F37 FUTURE policy the user tested. > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes. If the new F37 cryptographic policy considers RSA-2048 to be > > > > > > weak, > > > > > > it should be reverted. > > > > > > > > > > The actual proposal is in the OP. > > > > > > > > > > Not only there's no such thing as "new F37 policy" happening, > > > > > the F39 DEFAULT does allow RSA-2048, > > > > > and this is spelled out upfront in the proposal text in the OP. > > > > > RSA-3072 is only the minimum for the opt-in FUTURE policy, > > > > > which has been the case since at least F28. > > > > > > > > > I'm sorry. You are right that the key length limit won't change. > > > > > > > > Probably what confused us is this sentence: > > > > > > > > Test your setup with FUTURE today and file bugs so you won't get > > > > bit by > > > > Fedora 38-39. > > > > > > > > That's obviously incorect because current FUTURE is not equvialent to > > > > the > > > > proposed DEFAULT. I recommend you to reword the testing procedure so > > > > that > > > > people are not bitten by this discrepancy. > > > > > > > > Maybe you should prepare a policy DEFAULT-F39, package it into current > > > > Fedora, > > > > and ask people to test DEFAULT-F39 instead of FUTURE or FUTURE:SHA1. > > > > > > That'd be TEST-FEDORA39, mentioned as an alternative in the same sentence: > > > > > > > Install crypto-policies-scripts package and switch to a more > > > > restrictive policy > > > > with either update-crypto-policies --set FUTURE or > > > > update-crypto-policies --set TEST-FEDORA39. > > > > > > I chose to suggest them in this particular order > > > in hopes of bringing the world a tad closer to the FUTURE and not just > > > F39 DEFAULT. > > > > > > Should I drop it? > > > > That would be great. If this change is about SHA-1, I would only keep > > TEST-FEDORA39 in the Change page. > > > > If you want to promote FUTURE, you can keep a small notice at the end of How > > To Test section that people who want to sense security of far future, can > > try > > FUTURE policy. But make sure that it's written in an obvious way that FUTURE > > is out of scope of this Change. > > Fair. > Deprioritized testing FUTURE, warned that it's not gonna become defaults > and made TEST-FEDORA39 more prominent: > https://fedoraproject.org/w/index.php?title=Changes%2FStrongCryptoSettings3Forewarning1&type=revision&diff=646390&oldid=646384 > https://fedoraproject.org/w/index.php?title=Changes%2FStrongCryptoSettings3Forewarning2&type=revision&diff=646391&oldid=646385
Great. -- Petr
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