On Di, 20.12.22 13:56, Chris Murphy (li...@colorremedies.com) wrote:

> > * Better secure boot support (specifically the initrd is covered by
> > the signature).
>
> We need to solve the glaring hole that is the initrd. There's no
> question about it. I can't really assess if this feature is the best
> way to do that. Or if it would be adequate for dracut to self-sign
> every locally generated initrd with a unique key pair and throw away
> the private key after each initrd is generated.  Or if we could do
> enough strict standardization in the boot chain with a possibly
> larger kernel to avoid needing an initrd, i.e. get to sysroot mount
> faster thereby obviating the need for a large initrd.

Systems without initrd are unrealistic outside of corner cases. I am
pretty sure that if you care about SecureBoot then you must care about
protecting the root fs somehow, too. Otherwise fixing the initrd hole
is a pretty pointless excercise. Protecting the root fs means
encryption/LUKS, Verity or dm-integrity in some way. But that implies
an initrd, in particular if you want to hook that up with TPM or FIDO2
or so, which I am pretty sure should be considered a pretty common
case sooner or later.

I think initrd-less systems only make sense as a corner case for
certain low-security systems, but certainly not as a default.

Lennart

--
Lennart Poettering, Berlin
_______________________________________________
devel mailing list -- devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
To unsubscribe send an email to devel-le...@lists.fedoraproject.org
Fedora Code of Conduct: 
https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/
List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines
List Archives: 
https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
Do not reply to spam, report it: 
https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure/new_issue

Reply via email to