On Fri, Apr 24, 2026 at 02:44:38PM +0800, Jun Miao wrote: > TDX guests use encrypted memory that cannot be meaningfully > dumped by the hypervisor. Attempting a core dump on a TDX guest > would produce unusable output since the memory contents are > encrypted. And dump will make TDVM crash. > > Block the core dump operation for TDX guests early with a clear > error message instead of letting it proceed and abort the Qemu. > > Signed-off-by: Jun Miao <[email protected]> > --- > src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 7 +++++++ > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c > index b3e60471a8..555a6b6fb3 100644 > --- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c > +++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c > @@ -3249,6 +3249,13 @@ qemuDomainCoreDumpWithFormat(virDomainPtr dom, > if (virDomainObjCheckActive(vm) < 0) > goto endjob; > > + if (vm->def->sec && > + vm->def->sec->sectype == VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_TDX) { > + virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_UNSUPPORTED, "%s", > + _("core dump is not supported for TDX guests")); > + goto endjob; > + }
Conceptually it feels like we ought to block core dump for all launch security types surely ? Or are there some configurations where it could be permitted ? > + > priv = vm->privateData; > qemuDomainJobSetStatsType(vm->job->current, > QEMU_DOMAIN_JOB_STATS_TYPE_SAVEDUMP); > -- > 2.47.1 >
