Revision: 24073
http://sourceforge.net/p/gar/code/24073
Author: chninkel
Date: 2014-09-07 10:29:27 +0000 (Sun, 07 Sep 2014)
Log Message:
-----------
openssh/trunk: updated to current 6.7p1 snapshot
Modified Paths:
--------------
csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/Makefile
csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/checksums
csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/CSWopenssh.cswreleasenotes
csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/CSWopenssh_client.cswreleasenotes
Added Paths:
-----------
csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch
Removed Paths:
-------------
csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-6.6p1-gsskex-all-20140320.patch
Modified: csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/Makefile
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/Makefile 2014-09-07 10:26:04 UTC (rev 24072)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/Makefile 2014-09-07 10:29:27 UTC (rev 24073)
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
###### Package information #######
NAME = openssh
-VERSION = 6.6p1
+VERSION = 6.7p1
GSSKEX_PATCH_VERSION = 6.6p1
GSSKEX_PATCH_DATE = 20140320
GARTYPE = v2
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@
SPKG_DESC_CSWopenssh = OpenSSH Secure Shell server
BUILD_DEP_PKGS = CSWautoconf CSWlibssl-dev CSWlibz-dev
RUNTIME_DEP_PKGS_CSWopenssh += CSWlibssl1-0-0
-RUNTIME_DEP_PKGS_CSWopenssh += CSWlibwrap1
RUNTIME_DEP_PKGS_CSWopenssh += CSWlibz1
RUNTIME_DEP_PKGS_CSWopenssh += CSWlibkrb5-3
RUNTIME_DEP_PKGS_CSWopenssh += CSWlibcom-err3
@@ -116,13 +115,15 @@
###### Upstream and OpenCSW files information #######
-MASTER_SITES = ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/
http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/
+MASTER_SITES = ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/
http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/ http://www.mindrot.org/openssh_snap/
UPSTREAM_MASTER_SITES = ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/
# We define upstream file regex so we can be notifed of new upstream software
release
UFILES_REGEX = $(NAME)-(\d+(?:\.\d+)*p\d+).tar.gz
-DISTFILES = $(NAME)-$(VERSION).tar.gz
+#DISTFILES = $(NAME)-$(VERSION).tar.gz
+DISTFILES = openssh-SNAP-20140907.tar.gz
+DISTNAME = openssh
DISTFILES += CSWopenssh.cswreleasenotes
DISTFILES += CSWopenssh_client.cswreleasenotes
DISTFILES += cswusergroup
Modified: csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/checksums
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/checksums 2014-09-07 10:26:04 UTC (rev
24072)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/checksums 2014-09-07 10:29:27 UTC (rev
24073)
@@ -1 +1 @@
-3e9800e6bca1fbac0eea4d41baa7f239 openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz
+3c66cb6d7c729ba9963eb7af7ff06f51 openssh-SNAP-20140907.tar.gz
Modified: csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/CSWopenssh.cswreleasenotes
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/CSWopenssh.cswreleasenotes 2014-09-07
10:26:04 UTC (rev 24072)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/CSWopenssh.cswreleasenotes 2014-09-07
10:29:27 UTC (rev 24073)
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+openssh (6.7p1,REV=UNRELEASED) unstable
+
+ * New upstream release.
+ * Updated the GSSAPI key exchange patch
+
+ -- Yann Rouillard <[email protected]> Sun, 07 Sep 2014 12:27:42 +0100
+
openssh (6.6p1,REV=2014.03.20) unstable
* New upstream release.
Modified: csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/CSWopenssh_client.cswreleasenotes
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/CSWopenssh_client.cswreleasenotes
2014-09-07 10:26:04 UTC (rev 24072)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/CSWopenssh_client.cswreleasenotes
2014-09-07 10:29:27 UTC (rev 24073)
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+openssh (6.7p1,REV=UNRELEASED) unstable
+
+ * New upstream release.
+ * Updated the GSSAPI key exchange patch
+
+ -- Yann Rouillard <[email protected]> Sun, 07 Sep 2014 12:27:42 +0100
+
openssh (6.6p1,REV=2014.03.20) unstable
* New upstream release.
Deleted:
csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-6.6p1-gsskex-all-20140320.patch
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-6.6p1-gsskex-all-20140320.patch
2014-09-07 10:26:04 UTC (rev 24072)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-6.6p1-gsskex-all-20140320.patch
2014-09-07 10:29:27 UTC (rev 24073)
@@ -1,2938 +0,0 @@
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/ChangeLog.gssapi
openssh-5.8p1.new/ChangeLog.gssapi
---- openssh-5.8p1/ChangeLog.gssapi 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/ChangeLog.gssapi 2011-02-12 18:07:10.948345760 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
-+20110101
-+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
-+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
-+
-+20100308
-+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
-+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
-+ - [ servconf.c ]
-+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
-+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
-+ Watson.
-+ -
-+
-+20100124
-+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
-+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
-+ Colin Watson
-+
-+20090615
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
-+ sshd.c ]
-+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
-+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
-+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
-+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
-+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
-+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
-+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
-+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
-+ Cast data.length before printing
-+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
-+
-+20090201
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
-+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
-+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
-+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
-+
-+20080404
-+ - [ gss-serv.c ]
-+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
-+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
-+ Stoichkov
-+
-+20070317
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
-+ function
-+
-+20061220
-+ - [ servconf.c ]
-+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
-+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
-+
-+20060910
-+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
-+ ssh-gss.h ]
-+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
-+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
-+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
-+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
-+ <Bugzilla #928>
-+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
-+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
-+ configuration files
-+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
-+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
-+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
-+
-+20060909
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
-+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
-+ only, where they belong
-+ <Bugzilla #1225>
-+
-+20060829
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
-+ variable
-+
-+20060828
-+ - [ gss-genr.c ]
-+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
-+ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
-+
-+20060818
-+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
-+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
-+ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
-+
-+20060421
-+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
-+ fix compiler errors/warnings
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+ fix uninitialized variable warnings
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ gssgenr.c ]
-+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <Bugzilla #1220 >
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
-+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
-+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
-+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in
openssh-5.8p1.new/Makefile.in
---- openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in 2011-02-04 01:42:13.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/Makefile.in 2011-02-12 18:07:10.990611445 +0100
-@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
- atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
- monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
- kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
-+ kexgssc.o \
- msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
- jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o kr1.o
-
-@@ -91,7 +92,7 @@
- auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
- monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
- kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \
-- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
-+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
- loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/auth-krb5.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/auth-krb5.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/auth-krb5.c 2009-12-21 00:49:22.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/auth-krb5.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.002529804 +0100
-@@ -170,8 +170,13 @@
-
- len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
- authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
-+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#else
- snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
- authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -226,15 +231,22 @@
- #ifndef HEIMDAL
- krb5_error_code
- ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
-- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
-+ int ret;
- char ccname[40];
- mode_t old_umask;
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
-+#else
-+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
-+ int tmpfd, oerrno;
-+#endif
-
- ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
-- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-+ cctemplate, geteuid());
- if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
- return ENOMEM;
-
-+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
- old_umask = umask(0177);
- tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- oerrno = errno;
-@@ -249,6 +261,7 @@
- return oerrno;
- }
- close(tmpfd);
-+#endif
-
- return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
- }
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/auth2-gss.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/auth2-gss.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-gss.c 2007-12-02 12:59:45.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/auth2-gss.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.030761708 +0100
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@
- static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void
*ctxt);
- static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-+/*
-+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
-+ */
-+static int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+ int authenticated = 0;
-+ Buffer b;
-+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
-+ mic.length = len;
-+
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+ "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
-+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+ authctxt->pw));
-+
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ free(mic.value);
-+
-+ return (authenticated);
-+}
-+
- /*
- * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
- * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
-@@ -242,7 +278,8 @@
-
- packet_check_eom();
-
-- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+ authctxt->pw));
-
- authctxt->postponed = 0;
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-@@ -277,7 +314,8 @@
- gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-
- if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
-- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+ authenticated =
-+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
- else
- logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
-
-@@ -292,6 +330,12 @@
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
- }
-
-+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
-+ "gssapi-keyex",
-+ userauth_gsskeyex,
-+ &options.gss_authentication
-+};
-+
- Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- "gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/auth2.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c 2010-08-31 14:36:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/auth2.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.043418162 +0100
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
- extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
- extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
-@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@
- &method_none,
- &method_pubkey,
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+ &method_gsskeyex,
- &method_gssapi,
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/clientloop.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/clientloop.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/clientloop.c 2011-01-16 13:18:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/clientloop.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.063578136 +0100
-@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@
- #include "msg.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- /* import options */
- extern Options options;
-
-@@ -1483,6 +1487,15 @@
- /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
- if (!rekeying) {
- channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
-+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
-+ need_rekeying = 1;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
- debug("need rekeying");
- xxx_kex->done = 0;
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/configure.ac
openssh-5.8p1.new/configure.ac
---- openssh-5.8p1/configure.ac 2011-02-04 01:42:14.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/configure.ac 2011-02-12 18:07:11.092748915 +0100
-@@ -514,6 +514,30 @@
- [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
- [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
-+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
-+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
-+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
-+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
-+ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1,
-+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
-+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
-+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
-+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
-+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
-+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
-+ [cc_context_t c;
-+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
-+ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1,
-+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
-+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
-+ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the
credentials cache API ***)
-+ fi],
-+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
-+ )
- m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
- AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
- AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/gss-genr.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/gss-genr.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/gss-genr.c 2009-06-22 08:11:07.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/gss-genr.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.108432434 +0100
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-+typedef struct {
-+ char *encoded;
-+ gss_OID oid;
-+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
-+
-+/*
-+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
-+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
-+ */
-+
-+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
-+
-+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
-+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
-+ *
-+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
-+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
-+ */
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
-+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
-+ OM_uint32 min_status;
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
-+ host, client));
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
-+ const char *host, const char *client) {
-+ Buffer buf;
-+ size_t i;
-+ int oidpos, enclen;
-+ char *mechs, *encoded;
-+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+ char deroid[2];
-+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
-+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
-+
-+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
-+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
-+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
-+ free(gss_enc2oid);
-+ }
-+
-+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
-+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
-+
-+ buffer_init(&buf);
-+
-+ oidpos = 0;
-+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
-+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
-+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host,
client)) {
-+
-+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
-+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
-+
-+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
-+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
-+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
-+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
-+
-+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
-+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+
-+ if (oidpos != 0)
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
-+ oidpos++;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
-+
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
-+
-+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
-+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
-+ buffer_free(&buf);
-+
-+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
-+ free(mechs);
-+ mechs = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (mechs);
-+}
-+
-+gss_OID
-+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
-+ int i = 0;
-+
-+ switch (kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ }
-+
-+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
-+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
-+ i++;
-+
-+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
-+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
-+
-+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
-+}
-+
- /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
- int
- ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@
- }
-
- ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
-- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
-+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
- GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
- 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
-
-@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@
- }
-
- OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
-+{
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+ gss_name_t gssname;
-+ OM_uint32 status;
-+ gss_OID_set oidset;
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
-+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
-+
-+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
-+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
-+
-+ if (!ctx->major)
-+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
-+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+
-+ if (ctx->major)
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+
-+ return(ctx->major);
-+}
-+
-+OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
- {
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
- if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
- GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
-+/* Priviledged when used by server */
-+OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+{
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+}
-+
- void
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
- const char *context)
-@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@
- }
-
- int
--ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
-+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
-+ const char *client)
- {
- gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- OM_uint32 major, minor;
- gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
-+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
-+
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ ctx = &intctx;
-
- /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
-@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@
- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
- ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
- major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
-+
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
-+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
-+
- if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
- NULL);
-@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@
- GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- }
-
-- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
-
- return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
- }
-
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
-+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
-+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ static gss_name_t name;
-+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
-+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
-+ int equal;
-+ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
-+
-+ now = time(NULL);
-+
-+ if (ctxt) {
-+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
-+
-+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
-+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
-+
-+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
-+ saved_lifetime+= now;
-+ } else {
-+ /* Handle the error */
-+ }
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (now - last_call < 10)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ last_call = now;
-+
-+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
-+ return 0;
-+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
-+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
-+ return 1;
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2006-09-01 07:38:36.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/gss-serv-krb5.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.123072516 +0100
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@
- OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
- int len;
- const char *errmsg;
-+ const char *new_ccname;
-
- if (client->creds == NULL) {
- debug("No credentials stored");
-@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@
- return;
- }
-
-- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
-+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
-+
- client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
-- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
-- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
-- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
-+ client->store.filename = NULL;
-+#else
-+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
-+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -184,6 +190,71 @@
- return;
- }
-
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
-+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
-+ char *name = NULL;
-+ krb5_error_code problem;
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
-+ &principal))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
-+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+
-+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
-+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+
-+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+
-+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
-+ ccache))) {
-+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
- "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
- "Kerberos",
-@@ -191,7 +262,8 @@
- NULL,
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
- NULL,
-- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
-+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
-+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
- };
-
- #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/gss-serv.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/gss-serv.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/gss-serv.c 2008-05-19 07:05:07.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/gss-serv.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.135178913 +0100
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@
- #include "channels.h"
- #include "session.h"
- #include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "uidswap.h"
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
-+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0,
0};
-
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
-- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-
- #ifdef KRB5
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@
- char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
- gss_OID_set oidset;
-
-- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
-+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-
-- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- return (-1);
-- }
-+ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
-+ NULL, NULL)))
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
-- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- return (ctx->major);
-+ } else {
-+ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
- }
--
-- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
-- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
--
-- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- return (ctx->major);
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- }
-
- /* Privileged */
-@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@
- }
-
- /* Unprivileged */
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
-+ gss_OID_set supported;
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
-+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
-+ NULL, NULL));
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
-+ const char *dummy) {
-+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
-+ int res;
-+
-+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-+
-+ return (res);
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
- void
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
- {
-@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@
- gss_OID_set supported;
-
- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
-- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
-+ return;
-
- while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
- if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
-@@ -247,8 +284,48 @@
- ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- {
- int i = 0;
-+ int equal = 0;
-+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-
-- gss_buffer_desc ename;
-+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
-+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
-+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
-+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
-+ new_name, &equal);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!equal) {
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-+
-+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
-+
-+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
-+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
-+ client->name = new_name;
-+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
-+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+ client->updated = 1;
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-
- client->mech = NULL;
-
-@@ -263,6 +340,13 @@
- if (client->mech == NULL)
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
-+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
-+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
- if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
- &client->displayname, NULL))) {
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -280,6 +364,8 @@
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
-+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
-+
- /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
- client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
- ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-@@ -327,7 +413,7 @@
-
- /* Privileged */
- int
--ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- OM_uint32 lmin;
-
-@@ -337,9 +423,11 @@
- return 0;
- }
- if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
-- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
-+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
-+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
-+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
- return 1;
-- else {
-+ } else {
- /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
-@@ -352,14 +440,90 @@
- return (0);
- }
-
--/* Privileged */
--OM_uint32
--ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
-+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
-+ *
-+ * In the child, we want to :
-+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
-+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
-+ */
-+
-+/* Stuff for PAM */
-+
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
-+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
- {
-- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-+}
-+#endif
-
-- return (ctx->major);
-+void
-+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
-+ int ok;
-+ int ret;
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
-+ char *envstr;
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
-+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-+
-+ if (!ok)
-+ return;
-+
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
-+
-+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
-+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
-+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
-+ */
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ if (!use_privsep) {
-+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
-+ &pamconv, &pamh);
-+ if (ret)
-+ return;
-+
-+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
-+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
-+
-+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
-+ if (!ret)
-+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
-+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
-+ int ok = 0;
-+
-+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
-+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
-+
-+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
-+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
-+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
-+ else
-+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
-+
-+ restore_uid();
-+
-+ return ok;
- }
-
- #endif
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/kex.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/kex.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/kex.c 2010-09-24 14:11:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/kex.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.149564726 +0100
-@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
- #include "monitor.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
- # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
- # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
-@@ -94,6 +98,11 @@
- #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
- { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
- #endif
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 },
-+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 },
-+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 },
-+#endif
- { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
- };
-
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/kex.h
openssh-5.8p1.new/kex.h
---- openssh-5.8p1/kex.h 2010-09-24 14:11:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/kex.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.161650596 +0100
-@@ -73,7 +73,10 @@
- KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
- KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
- KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
- KEX_C25519_SHA256,
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
-+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
- KEX_MAX
- };
-
-@@ -129,6 +132,12 @@
- int flags;
- const EVP_MD *evp_md;
- int ec_nid;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ int gss_deleg_creds;
-+ int gss_trust_dns;
-+ char *gss_host;
-+ char *gss_client;
-+#endif
- char *client_version_string;
- char *server_version_string;
- int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
-@@ -156,6 +165,11 @@
- void kexecdh_client(Kex *);
- void kexecdh_server(Kex *);
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+void kexgss_client(Kex *);
-+void kexgss_server(Kex *);
-+#endif
-+
- void
- kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
- BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/kexgssc.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/kexgssc.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/kexgssc.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/kexgssc.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.176741991 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
-+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
-+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
-+ DH *dh;
-+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
-+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
-+ u_char *empty = "";
-+ char *msg;
-+ char *lang;
-+ int type = 0;
-+ int first = 1;
-+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+
-+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
-+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
-+
-+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
-+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
-+
-+ if (kex->gss_client &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
-+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group1();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group14();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
-+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+ packet_put_int(min);
-+ packet_put_int(nbits);
-+ packet_put_int(max);
-+
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+
-+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
-+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+
-+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
-+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
-+
-+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
-+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
-+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
-+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
-+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
-+
-+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
-+
-+ do {
-+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
-+
-+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+ &ret_flags);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ }
-+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+ }
-+
-+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+ free(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
-+
-+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+ */
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ if (first) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+ first = 0;
-+ } else {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ }
-+ packet_send();
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+
-+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+ do {
-+ type = packet_read();
-+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+ if (serverhostkey)
-+ fatal("Server host key received
more than once");
-+ serverhostkey =
-+ packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ }
-+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
-+
-+ switch (type) {
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from
server when complete");
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
-+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
-+
-+ /* Is there a token included? */
-+ if (packet_get_char()) {
-+ recv_tok.value=
-+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+ /* If we're already complete - protocol
error */
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol
error: received token when complete");
-+ } else {
-+ /* No token included */
-+ if (maj_status !=
GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+
packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+ debug("Received Error");
-+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
-+ min_status = packet_get_int();
-+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
-+ default:
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't
expect packet type %d",
-+ type);
-+ }
-+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+ } else {
-+ /* No data, and not complete */
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+ }
-+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
-+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
-+ */
-+
-+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I
expected it");
-+
-+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
-+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
-+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
-+
-+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
-+ klen = DH_size(dh);
-+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
-+ if (kout < 0)
-+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+ shared_secret = BN_new();
-+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+ free(kbuf);
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
-+ kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
-+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
-+ shared_secret, /* K */
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ kexgex_hash(
-+ kex->hash_alg,
-+ kex->client_version_string,
-+ kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+ min, nbits, max,
-+ dh->p, dh->g,
-+ dh->pub_key,
-+ dh_server_pub,
-+ shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = hash;
-+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
-+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
-+
-+ free(msg_tok.value);
-+
-+ DH_free(dh);
-+ if (serverhostkey)
-+ free(serverhostkey);
-+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-+
-+ /* save session id */
-+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+ else
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+ kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ kex_finish(kex);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/kexgsss.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/kexgsss.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/kexgsss.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/kexgsss.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.186584789 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
-+{
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+ */
-+
-+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
-+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+ DH *dh;
-+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
-+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-+ int type = 0;
-+ gss_OID oid;
-+ char *mechs;
-+
-+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
-+
-+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
-+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
-+ * into life
-+ */
-+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
-+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
-+ free(mechs);
-+
-+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
-+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
-+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
-+
-+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
-+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group1();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group14();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ debug("Doing group exchange");
-+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+ min = packet_get_int();
-+ nbits = packet_get_int();
-+ max = packet_get_int();
-+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
-+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+ min, nbits, max);
-+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
-+ if (dh == NULL)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group
found");
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ packet_write_wait();
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+ do {
-+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
-+ type = packet_read();
-+ switch(type) {
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
-+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after
initialising");
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ recv_tok.length = slen;
-+
-+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
-+
-+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ recv_tok.length = slen;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ packet_disconnect(
-+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+ type);
-+ }
-+
-+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
-+
-+ free(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-+ fatal("No client public key");
-+
-+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+ }
-+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+ }
-+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
-+
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
-+
-+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
-+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-+
-+ klen = DH_size(dh);
-+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
-+ if (kout < 0)
-+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+ shared_secret = BN_new();
-+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+ free(kbuf);
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ kex_dh_hash(
-+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
-+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ kexgex_hash(
-+ kex->hash_alg,
-+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ NULL, 0,
-+ min, nbits, max,
-+ dh->p, dh->g,
-+ dh_client_pub,
-+ dh->pub_key,
-+ shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+ }
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = hash;
-+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
-+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
-+
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ } else {
-+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
-+ }
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+ else
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+ DH_free(dh);
-+
-+ kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ kex_finish(kex);
-+
-+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
-+ * just exchanged. */
-+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
-+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+}
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/key.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/key.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/key.c 2011-02-04 01:48:34.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/key.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.202089386 +0100
-@@ -929,6 +929,7 @@
- { "[email protected]", "ECDSA-CERT",
- KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1 },
- #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-+ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 },
- { "[email protected]", "RSA-CERT-V00",
- KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 },
- { "[email protected]", "DSA-CERT-V00",
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/key.h
openssh-5.8p1.new/key.h
---- openssh-5.8p1/key.h 2010-11-05 00:19:49.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/key.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.216270794 +0100
-@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
- KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
- KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
- KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
-+ KEY_NULL,
- KEY_UNSPEC
- };
- enum fp_type {
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c 2010-09-10 03:23:34.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.241713537 +0100
-@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@
- int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -241,6 +243,7 @@
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
- {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
-@@ -253,6 +256,12 @@
- };
-
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
-+#endif
- {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
-@@ -357,6 +366,10 @@
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
-@@ -443,6 +456,10 @@
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-@@ -1692,7 +1709,14 @@
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
-@@ -1898,6 +1922,9 @@
- OM_uint32 major;
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- goid.length = len;
-
-@@ -1925,6 +1952,9 @@
- OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- in.length = len;
- major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
-@@ -1942,6 +1972,7 @@
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
- }
- return (0);
- }
-@@ -1953,6 +1984,9 @@
- OM_uint32 ret;
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- gssbuf.length = len;
- mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-@@ -1979,7 +2013,11 @@
- {
- int authenticated;
-
-- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
-@@ -1992,6 +2030,74 @@
- /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
- return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+ gss_buffer_desc data;
-+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+ data.length = len;
-+ if (data.length != 20)
-+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
-+ (int) data.length);
-+
-+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
-+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
-+ session_id2_len = data.length;
-+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
-+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
-+ }
-+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
-+
-+ free(data.value);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
-+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
-+
-+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
-+
-+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-+
-+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+ int ok;
-+
-+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+
-+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
-+
-+ free(store.filename);
-+ free(store.envvar);
-+ free(store.envval);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
-+
-+ return(0);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- #ifdef JPAKE
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h
openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor.h
---- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h 2008-11-05 06:20:46.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.311728071 +0100
-@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@
- MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK = 46, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK = 47,
- MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
- MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
-+
-+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 62, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 63,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 64, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 65,
-
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c 2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor_wrap.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.359631731 +0100
-@@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@
- }
-
- int
--mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- Buffer m;
- int authenticated = 0;
-@@ -1249,6 +1249,51 @@
- debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not
");
- return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+OM_uint32
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+ OM_uint32 major;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+
-+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
-+ hash->length = len;
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+ return(major);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+ int ok;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS,
&m);
-+
-+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+ return (ok);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- #ifdef JPAKE
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h
openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h 2009-03-05 14:58:22.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor_wrap.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.407619296 +0100
-@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
- gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
--int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/readconf.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/readconf.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/readconf.c 2010-11-20 05:19:38.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/readconf.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.460306621 +0100
-@@ -129,6 +129,8 @@
- oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
- oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
- oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
-+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
-+ oGssServerIdentity,
- oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
- oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
- oHashKnownHosts,
-@@ -169,10 +171,19 @@
- { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
- #if defined(GSSAPI)
- { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
-+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
-+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
-+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
- #endif
- { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
- { "usersh", oDeprecated },
-@@ -479,10 +490,30 @@
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssKeyEx:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case oGssDelegateCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssTrustDns:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
-+ case oGssClientIdentity:
-+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
-+ goto parse_string;
-+
-+ case oGssServerIdentity:
-+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
-+ goto parse_string;
-+
-+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case oBatchMode:
- intptr = &options->batch_mode;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1092,7 +1123,12 @@
- options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
- options->gss_authentication = -1;
-+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
- options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
-+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
-+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
-+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
-+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -1193,8 +1229,14 @@
- options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
- if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
- options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
-+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
-+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/readconf.h
openssh-5.8p1.new/readconf.h
---- openssh-5.8p1/readconf.h 2010-11-20 05:19:38.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/readconf.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.507187275 +0100
-@@ -46,7 +46,12 @@
- int challenge_response_authentication;
- /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
- int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
-+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
- int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
-+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
-+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
-+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
-+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
- int password_authentication; /* Try password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive
auth. */
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/servconf.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/servconf.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/servconf.c 2010-11-20 05:19:38.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/servconf.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.533252334 +0100
-@@ -97,7 +97,10 @@
- options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
- options->gss_authentication=-1;
-+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
-+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -226,8 +229,14 @@
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
- if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
-+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
-+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
-+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
-+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -322,7 +331,9 @@
- sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
-- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
-+ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
-@@ -386,10 +397,20 @@
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -944,10 +965,22 @@
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case sGssKeyEx:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case sGssCleanupCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case sGssStrictAcceptor:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
-+ case sGssStoreRekey:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case sPasswordAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1704,7 +1737,10 @@
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/servconf.h
openssh-5.8p1.new/servconf.h
---- openssh-5.8p1/servconf.h 2010-11-20 05:19:38.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/servconf.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.548572408 +0100
-@@ -97,7 +97,10 @@
- int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS
token if
- * authenticated with Kerberos.
*/
- int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI
authentication */
-+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange
*/
- int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on
logout */
-+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI
acceptor name */
-+ int gss_store_rekey;
- int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/ssh-gss.h
openssh-5.8p1.new/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-5.8p1/ssh-gss.h 2007-06-12 15:40:39.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/ssh-gss.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.567306608 +0100
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -60,10 +60,22 @@
-
- #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
-
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
-+
- typedef struct {
- char *filename;
- char *envvar;
- char *envval;
-+ struct passwd *owner;
- void *data;
- } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
-
-@@ -71,8 +83,11 @@
- gss_buffer_desc displayname;
- gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
- gss_cred_id_t creds;
-+ gss_name_t name;
- struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
- ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+ int used;
-+ int updated;
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
-
- typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-@@ -83,6 +98,7 @@
- int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
- void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
-
- typedef struct {
-@@ -93,10 +109,11 @@
- gss_OID oid; /* client */
- gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
- gss_name_t client; /* server */
-- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
-+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
- } Gssctxt;
-
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
-+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
-
- int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
-@@ -116,16 +133,30 @@
- void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
--int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char
*);
-+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
-
- /* In the server */
-+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
-+ const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
-+ const char *);
-+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
-+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
-+ const char *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
--int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
-+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
- void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-
-+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
-+
-+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/ssh_config
openssh-5.8p1.new/ssh_config
---- openssh-5.8p1/ssh_config 2010-01-12 09:40:27.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/ssh_config 2011-02-12 18:07:11.580240516 +0100
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
- # HostbasedAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
-+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
- # BatchMode no
- # CheckHostIP yes
- # AddressFamily any
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/ssh_config.5
openssh-5.8p1.new/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-5.8p1/ssh_config.5 2010-12-26 04:26:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/ssh_config.5 2011-02-12 18:07:11.600266821 +0100
-@@ -508,11 +508,43 @@
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
-+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
-+identity will be used.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
-+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
-+hostname.
- .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
--Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
-+If set to
-+.Dq yes
-+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
-+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
-+credentials to a session on the server.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
-+Set to
-+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
-+the name of the host being connected to. If
-+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
-+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect2.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect2.c 2010-12-01 02:21:51.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/sshconnect2.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.623078773 +0100
-@@ -159,9 +159,34 @@
- {
- Kex *kex;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
-+ char *gss_host = NULL;
-+#endif
-+
- xxx_host = host;
- xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = host;
-+
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
options.gss_client_identity);
-+ if (gss) {
-+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
- logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using
defaults.");
- options.ciphers = NULL;
-@@ -196,6 +221,17 @@
- if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+ "%s,null", orig);
-+ free(gss);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
-
-@@ -206,11 +242,31 @@
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
- kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
-+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
-+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
-+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-+ } else {
-+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- xxx_kex = kex;
-
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
-@@ -304,6 +360,7 @@
- void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
- void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
- #endif
-
- void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
-@@ -319,6 +376,11 @@
-
- Authmethod authmethods[] = {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {"gssapi-keyex",
-+ userauth_gsskeyex,
-+ NULL,
-+ &options.gss_authentication,
-+ NULL},
- {"gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
- NULL,
-@@ -625,19 +687,31 @@
- static u_int mech = 0;
- OM_uint32 min;
- int ok = 0;
-+ const char *gss_host;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
-+ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = authctxt->host;
-
- /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
- * once. */
-
- if (gss_supported == NULL)
-- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
-+ gss_supported = NULL;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-
- /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
- while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
- /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
- if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
- ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
-- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
-+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
-+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
- ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
- } else {
- mech++;
-@@ -734,8 +808,8 @@
- {
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt;
-- int oidlen;
-- char *oidv;
-+ u_int oidlen;
-+ u_char *oidv;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
-@@ -845,6 +919,48 @@
- free(msg);
- free(lang);
- }
-+
-+int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+ Buffer b;
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ OM_uint32 ms;
-+
-+ static int attempt = 0;
-+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
-+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
-+ "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
-+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- int
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/sshd.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/sshd.c
---- openssh-5.8p1/sshd.c 2011-01-11 07:20:31.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/sshd.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.656005267 +0100
-@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@
- #include "roaming.h"
- #include "version.h"
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #ifdef LIBWRAP
- #include <tcpd.h>
- #include <syslog.h>
-@@ -1590,10 +1594,13 @@
- logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
- }
-+#ifndef GSSAPI
-+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
- logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
- }
-+#endif
- if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
- logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
- exit(1);
-@@ -1922,6 +1929,60 @@
- /* Log the connection. */
- verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+ /*
-+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
-+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
-+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
-+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
-+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
-+ *
-+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
-+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
-+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
-+ * same session (bad).
-+ *
-+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
-+ * automatically.
-+ *
-+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
-+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
-+ */
-+ {
-+ OSStatus err = 0;
-+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
-+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
-+
-+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+ else
-+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes
are %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+
-+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
-+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
-+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
-+ else {
-+ debug("Creating new security session...");
-+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+
-+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
-+ &sattrs);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+ else
-+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session
Attributes are %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- /*
- * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
- * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
-@@ -2303,6 +2364,48 @@
-
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {
-+ char *orig;
-+ char *gss = NULL;
-+ char *newstr = NULL;
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
-+ * the other key exchange algorithms
-+ */
-+
-+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
-+ orig = NULL;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_keyex)
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+ else
-+ gss = NULL;
-+
-+ if (gss && orig)
-+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ else if (gss)
-+ newstr = gss;
-+ else if (orig)
-+ newstr = orig;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
-+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
-+ * host key algorithm we support
-+ */
-+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
-+
-+ if (newstr)
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
-+ else
-+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- /* start key exchange */
- kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
-@@ -2310,6 +2413,13 @@
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config
openssh-5.8p1.new/sshd_config
---- openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config 2010-09-10 03:20:12.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/sshd_config 2011-02-12 18:07:11.668077725 +0100
-@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
-+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
-+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.5
openssh-5.8p1.new/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.5 2010-12-26 04:26:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.8p1.new/sshd_config.5 2011-02-12 18:07:11.685676774 +0100
-@@ -423,12 +423,40 @@
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
-+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
- .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
- Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
- on logout.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
-+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
-+a client authenticates against. If
-+.Dq yes
-+then the client must authenticate against the
-+.Pa host
-+service on the current hostname. If
-+.Dq no
-+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
-+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation
-+on multi homed machines.
-+The default is
-+.Dq yes .
-+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
-+and setting it to
-+.Dq no
-+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
-+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
-+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
-+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
-+.Dq no .
- .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
- Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
- with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
Added: csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch
===================================================================
--- csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch
(rev 0)
+++ csw/mgar/pkg/openssh/trunk/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch
2014-09-07 10:29:27 UTC (rev 24073)
@@ -0,0 +1,2937 @@
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/ChangeLog.gssapi
openssh-5.8p1.new/ChangeLog.gssapi
+--- openssh-5.8p1/ChangeLog.gssapi 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/ChangeLog.gssapi 2011-02-12 18:07:10.948345760 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
++20110101
++ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
++ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
++
++20100308
++ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
++ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
++ - [ servconf.c ]
++ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
++ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
++ Watson.
++ -
++
++20100124
++ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
++ Colin Watson
++
++20090615
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
++ sshd.c ]
++ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
++ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
++ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
++ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
++ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
++ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
++ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
++ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
++ Cast data.length before printing
++ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
++
++20090201
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
++ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
++ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
++ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
++
++20080404
++ - [ gss-serv.c ]
++ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
++ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
++ Stoichkov
++
++20070317
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
++ function
++
++20061220
++ - [ servconf.c ]
++ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
++ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
++
++20060910
++ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
++ ssh-gss.h ]
++ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
++ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
++ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
++ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
++ <Bugzilla #928>
++ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
++ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
++ configuration files
++ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
++ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
++ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
++
++20060909
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
++ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
++ only, where they belong
++ <Bugzilla #1225>
++
++20060829
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
++ variable
++
++20060828
++ - [ gss-genr.c ]
++ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
++ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
++
++20060818
++ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
++ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
++ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
++
++20060421
++ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
++ fix compiler errors/warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ fix uninitialized variable warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ gssgenr.c ]
++ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Bugzilla #1220 >
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
++ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
++ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in
openssh-5.8p1.new/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in 2011-02-04 01:42:13.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/Makefile.in 2011-02-12 18:07:10.990611445 +0100
+@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
+ atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
+ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+ kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
++ kexgssc.o \
+ msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
+ jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o kr1.o
+
+@@ -91,7 +92,7 @@
+ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
+ monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
+ kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \
+- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
+ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/auth-krb5.c
openssh-5.8p1.new/auth-krb5.c
@@ Diff output truncated at 100000 characters. @@
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