Restore the file-owner information for each 'struct file'.  This is
essentially is like a new fcntl(F_SETOWN) and fcntl(F_SETSIG) calls,
except that the pid, uid, euid and signum values are read from the
checkpoint image.

Changelog[v3]:
        - [Oren Laadan]: Ensure find_vpid() found a valid pid before
          making it the file owner.
Changelog[v2]:
        - [Matt Helsley, Serge Hallyn]: Don't trust uids in checkpoint image.
          (added CAP_KILL check)
        - Check that signal number read from the checkpoint image is valid.
          (not sure it is required, since its an incomplete check for tampering)

Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <[email protected]>
---
 fs/checkpoint.c |   66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/checkpoint.c b/fs/checkpoint.c
index ce1b4af..b5486c1 100644
--- a/fs/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/checkpoint.c
@@ -618,6 +618,68 @@ static int attach_file(struct file *file)
        return fd;
 }
 
+static int restore_file_owner(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct ckpt_hdr_file *h,
+               struct file *file)
+{
+       int ret;
+       struct pid *pid;
+       uid_t uid, euid;
+
+       uid = h->f_owner_uid;
+       euid = h->f_owner_euid;
+
+       ckpt_debug("restore_file_owner(): uid %u, euid %u, pid %d, type %d\n",
+                       uid, euid, h->f_owner_pid, h->f_owner_pid_type);
+       /*
+        * We can't trust the uids in the checkpoint image and normally need
+        * CAP_KILL. But if the uids match our ids, should be fine since we
+        * have access to the file.
+        *
+        * TODO: Move this check to __f_setown() ?
+        */
+       ret = -EACCES;
+       if (!capable(CAP_KILL) &&
+                       (uid != current_uid() || euid != current_euid())) {
+               ckpt_err(ctx, ret, "image uids [%d, %d] don't match current "
+                               "process uids [%d, %d] and no CAP_KILL\n",
+                               uid, euid, current_uid(), current_euid());
+               return ret;
+       }
+
+       ret = -EINVAL;
+       if (!valid_signal(h->f_owner_signum)) {
+               ckpt_err(ctx, ret, "Invalid signum %d\n", h->f_owner_signum);
+               return ret;
+       }
+       file->f_owner.signum = h->f_owner_signum;
+
+       rcu_read_lock();
+
+       /*
+        * If file had a non-NULL owner and we can't find the owner after
+        * restart, return error.
+        */
+       pid = find_vpid(h->f_owner_pid);
+       if (h->f_owner_pid && !pid)
+               ret = -ESRCH;
+       else {
+               /*
+                * TODO: Do we need 'force' to be 1 here or can it be 0 ?
+                *       'force' is used to modify the owner, if one is
+                *       already set. Can it be set when we restart an
+                *       application ?
+                */
+               ret = __f_setown(file, pid, h->f_owner_pid_type, uid, euid, 1);
+       }
+
+       rcu_read_unlock();
+
+       if (ret < 0)
+               ckpt_err(ctx, ret, "__fsetown_uid() failed\n");
+
+       return ret;
+}
+
 #define CKPT_SETFL_MASK  \
        (O_APPEND | O_NONBLOCK | O_NDELAY | FASYNC | O_DIRECT | O_NOATIME)
 
@@ -651,6 +713,10 @@ int restore_file_common(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct file 
*file,
        if (ret < 0)
                return ret;
 
+       ret = restore_file_owner(ctx, h, file);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               return ret;
+
        /*
         * Normally f_mode is set by open, and modified only via
         * fcntl(), so its value now should match that at checkpoint.
-- 
1.6.0.4

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