Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issues to consider: - [Medium] ovl: ovl_copyfile() leaks real_in/real_out refs when override fails - [Medium] ve/overlayfs: backing-file I/O switches creds without the matching VE override - [Low] ovl: ovl_lower_positive() returns false when ovl_override_creds() fails - [Low] ovl: ovl_nlink_end() silently skips index cleanup on override failure --
commit 9665af403c75ade64577a4c77c18a22fb272209d Author: Vladimir Riabchun <[email protected]> ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds ovl_override_creds() now returns an error and fills a struct ovl_creds_desc holding both the old cred and the old VE. ovl_revert_creds() restores both. Every caller is converted, so overlayfs switches the VE together with the creator creds. Access to an overlayfs created in a different CT is rejected with -EPERM. > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c > index 2531433f47bf..464699e51695 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c [ ... ] > @@ -520,14 +527,19 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t > pos_in, > * verify read access with the source mounter creds. > */ > if (unlikely(inode_in->i_sb != inode_out->i_sb)) { > - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode_in->i_sb); > + ret = ovl_override_creds(inode_in->i_sb, &old_cred); > + if (ret) > + goto out_unlock; > ret = rw_verify_area(READ, fd_file(real_in), &pos_in, len); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); > if (unlikely(ret)) > goto out_unlock; > } [Severity: Medium] Does this new error exit leak the real_in and real_out file references? Both were taken by ovl_real_fdget() earlier in ovl_copyfile(), but out_unlock only calls inode_unlock(inode_out), so fdput() is never reached. Before this patch the override could not fail, so the leak is a regression. A task in one CT doing copy_file_range() between its own overlayfs and one created by another CT gets -EPERM from override_VE() and leaks both files on every attempt. The second ovl_override_creds() failure below already uses skip_switch, which reaches the fdput() calls. [ ... ] > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c > index efa2a072aa69..edc11a7b27ee 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c [ ... ] > @@ -1426,7 +1436,10 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry) > if (!ovl_dentry_upper(dentry)) > return true; > > - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); > + /* Ugh, hard - we can't pass an error from here. */ > + if (ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred)) > + return false; > + [Severity: Low] Is false the safe answer when the override fails? Returning false means "no lower entry exists", so ovl_do_remove() would choose ovl_remove_upper() instead of ovl_remove_and_whiteout(), and ovl_rename() would skip RENAME_WHITEOUT. A lower file could then reappear after unlink. In practice the later override calls in the same operation fail the same way, but correctness then depends on call ordering. The lookup-error branch of this function already assumes "something is there" and sets positive = true. Would returning true here be consistent with that? [ ... ] > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c > index 817563215001..273b2e2e17eb 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c > @@ -63,11 +63,38 @@ struct dentry *ovl_workdir(struct dentry *dentry) > return ofs->workdir; > } > > -const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb) > +/* On error no revert is needed. */ > +int ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_creds_desc *desc) > { > struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb); > > - return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred); > + /* Cleanup after previous users */ > + *desc = (struct ovl_creds_desc) {}; > + > + if (ve_is_super(ofs->creator_ve) && !ve_is_super(get_exec_env())) { > + /* Host overlayfs used from a CT: host creds work there. */ > + desc->ve = NULL; > + desc->ve_overridden = false; > + } else { > + desc->ve = override_ve(ofs->creator_ve); > + if (IS_ERR(desc->ve)) > + return PTR_ERR(desc->ve); > + desc->ve_overridden = true; > + } > + > + desc->cred = override_creds(ofs->creator_cred); > + return 0; > +} [Severity: Medium] As reported by Pavel Tikhomirov on v2 [1], the conversion is incomplete. Are the users of ovl_creds() still left with the cred/VE mismatch this patch describes? ovl_read_iter(), ovl_write_iter(), ovl_splice_read(), ovl_splice_write() and ovl_mmap() set backing_file_ctx.cred = ovl_creds(sb). The helpers in fs/backing-file.c then call only override_creds(ctx->cred), with no override_ve(). ve_capable() uses current->overrided_ve ?: get_exec_env(), so on these paths the creator creds are still checked against the caller's VE. A host task reading a file on a CT overlayfs is one such case. Cross-CT access is also not rejected there with -EPERM, unlike the paths converted here. The commit message suggests all users of the old cred are covered, which is not the case. > + > +/* Accepts desc from a failed ovl_override_creds and does nothing. */ > +void ovl_revert_creds(struct ovl_creds_desc *old_creds) > +{ > + if (IS_ERR(old_creds->ve)) > + return; > + > + revert_creds(old_creds->cred); > + if (old_creds->ve_overridden) > + revert_ve(old_creds->ve); > } [ ... ] > @@ -1228,11 +1258,15 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry) > ovl_drop_write(dentry); > > if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode) && inode->i_nlink == 0) { > - const struct cred *old_cred; > + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; > + int err; > > - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); > - ovl_cleanup_index(dentry); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); > + if (err) > + pr_err("%s: skipping ovl_cleanup_index.\n", __func__); > + else > + ovl_cleanup_index(dentry); > + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); > } [Severity: Low] Is it acceptable to silently skip ovl_cleanup_index() here? ovl_nlink_end() is void and runs after the upper unlink or rename has already succeeded. If the override fails, an orphan index entry is left behind with i_nlink at 0, and only a pr_err() records it. The old code could not fail at this point. ovl_nlink_start() would normally have failed first for the same task, sb and VE, so this looks mostly unreachable. But it is an error path that now leaves stale state. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/179318868950.3559520.6473416824609223980.b4-review@b4 -- Sashiko AI review ยท https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=5 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
