Break up the data into shares that have to be combined in order to
recover the original. Distribute the shares in the system.
This way no node contains data that is useful/incriminating all
by itself.
On Tue, Apr 10, 2001 at 03:27:40AM -0500, Brandon wrote:
>
> > Let's say that someone decides they want to build a key index of nekkid
> > eskimos.
>
> You're question doesn't have anything to do with indices. You're question
> is just rather Freenet node operators are safe an attack where their node
> is confiscated and then the attacker does a brute force attack on all
> known keys to find illicit material on the node. (This is unrelated to key
> indices as there are other ways to find keys.)
>
> And the answer is no. Not only that, but it's, as far as I can tell,
> impossible to defend against this attack. The benefit of Freenet is that
> it's harder for Them to detect that you're trafficking in illicit content.
> If they already suspect you and can seize your computer then you're
> screwed in a lot of ways. Other ways include looking in your browser
> cache, data recovery techniques on your hard drive which show deleted
> files, and tempest scanning of your monitor. At least with Freenet, unlike
> the web, They can't tap your connection or stack you by monitoring a site.
>
> If anyone has a theoretical solution to the problem of confiscation and
> brute force key cracking then I'd love to hear it.
>
>
>
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